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Research ArticleArticles

Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector

Evidence from School Inspections

Iftikhar Hussain
Journal of Human Resources, January 2015, 50 (1) 189-221; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.1.189
Iftikhar Hussain
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Journal of Human Resources: 50 (1)
Journal of Human Resources
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1 Jan 2015
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Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector
Iftikhar Hussain
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2015, 50 (1) 189-221; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.50.1.189

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Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector
Iftikhar Hussain
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2015, 50 (1) 189-221; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.50.1.189
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  • Article
    • Abstract
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Background
    • III. Empirical Strategy
    • IV. Results
    • V. The Short-Term Effect of Being Inspected: The Case of Nonfail Schools
    • VI. Conclusion
    • Footnotes
    • References
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