Abstract
Estimates of the most common mobility measure, the intergenerational elasticity, can be severely biased if snapshots are used to approximate lifetime income. However, little is known about biases in other popular dependence measures. Using long Swedish income series, we provide such evidence for log-linear and rank correlations, and rank-based transition probabilities. Attenuation bias is considerably weaker in rank-based measures. Life-cycle bias is strongest in the elasticity, moderate in log-linear correlations, and small in rank-based measures. However, there are important exceptions: persistence in the tails of the distribution is considerably higher and long-distance downward mobility lower than estimates from short-run income suggest.
I. Introduction
A growing literature studies to what degree differences in long-run economic status persist across generations. Researchers typically aim to estimate the dependence between lifetime incomes or earnings of parents and offspring, with strong associations implying a low degree of intergenerational mobility (and vice versa). Descriptive measures of that dependence provide not only a useful account of the dynamic dimension of inequality across generations, but are also key starting points for the analysis of the underlying causal mechanisms of transmission.
However, the most common dependence measure, the intergenerational elasticity, can be severely mismeasured if snapshots of income are used to approximate lifetime values. Elasticity estimates are sensitive to both attenuation (Solon 1992; Mazumder 2005) and life-cycle bias from heterogeneous age-income profiles (Grawe 2006, Haider and Solon 2006; Nybom and Stuhler 2016). An improved understanding of these approximation biases have led to large upward corrections of elasticity estimates, and a substantially revised picture of how mobile many developed countries are (Solon 1999; Black and Devereux 2011; Jäntti and Jenkins 2015).
Partly in response, researchers have turned to other dependence measures: linear or Pearson correlations, which abstract from changes in cross-sectional inequality; rank or Spearman correlations, which capture the association between the relative position of parents and children in the marginal distributions; and transition matrices, often with particular focus on the poorest or richest in the population. Rank-based measures are the basis for much of the recent descriptive evidence on mobility differentials across countries (Corak, Lindquist, and Mazumder 2014; Bratberg et al. 2017), time (Chetty et al. 2014b; Pekkarinen, Salvanes, and Sarvimäki 2017), and regions within countries (Chetty et al. 2014a), aswell as quasi-experimental evidence (Chetty and Hendren 2015).
These alternative measures provide different and thus complementary perspectives on the degree and nature of mobility. However, little is known about their robustness to measurement error. Linear correlation estimates are frequently reported in the literature, especially in cross-country and other comparative studies (Björklund and Jäntti 2009). Yet, we found no comprehensive evidence on approximation bias in such estimates. Work on rank-based measures includes O’Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2007), who simulate the effect of observational errors on transition matrices; Dahl and DeLeire (2008), who note that estimates of the rank correlation are comparatively insensitive to specification choices; and Chetty et al. (2014a) and Mazumder (2015), who observe that such estimates appear quite stable. These are promising insights for the literature, which often has to rely on only a handful or even a single income observation per individual. However, the robustness of these alternative measures has not yet been assessed systematically using data on actual lifetime incomes.
Here we provide evidence on approximation biases across all four dependence measures. Our empirical analysis takes advantage of unusually long administrative series of income data from Sweden. The observation of nearly career-long income histories of parents and offspring allows us to derive benchmark estimates and to directly expose the bias that arises when using shorter income spans. Our analysis shows that the consequences of measurement error differ strongly across dependence measures, but often in ways that appear systematic and generalizable. A key finding is that rank-based estimates are both the least attenuated and the most stable over age. Although not perfect substitutes for the elasticity, their consideration may thus mitigate some of the measurement issues that currently restrict the literature. Moreover, we propose a simple procedure to address measurement error in the Spearman rank correlation, motivated by the observation that errors in ranks are by definition negatively correlated to true rank.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe conceptual differences between the standard measures in the next section, our data in Section III, and our basic results in Section IV. In Section V we provide theoretical explanations for our findings, present additional evidence, and motivate and discuss the correction procedure for rank correlations. We further study the copula of parental and offspring incomes, to test if the robustness of the positional measures holds along the joint distribution of ranks. Section VI concludes.
II. Standard Measures of Intergenerational
Income Dependence In economics, most empirical work measures the intergenerational transmission of economic status by characterizing the joint distribution of the lifetime incomes of children and their parents. Although this joint distribution can be analyzed nonparametrically in larger samples, a more parsimonious summary measure is often useful, in particular for comparative purposes. Various summary measures are used in the literature, each providing a specific perspective on the extent and nature of intergenerational mobility within a population. While our focus is on their robustness to errors from the usage of short income spans, it is useful to also note their conceptual differences.
Awell-established measure is the intergenerational elasticity, commonly estimated as the slope coefficient in a regression of offspring on parent log income. The elasticity is a measure of persistence, whereas its inverse can be interpreted as the expected rate at which incomes regress to the mean between generations. The elasticity has long been the most popular mobility measure among economists—possibly due to the appeal of its regression-to-the-mean interpretation, possibly due to its derivability as a reduced-form relationship from standard models of parental investments in offspring (Becker and Tomes 1979; Solon 2004)—and is also a key ingredient for the calibration of structural models of mobility (for example, Lee and Seshadri 2015).
Closely related is the linear (Pearson) correlation in log income. As the elasticity equals the linear correlation times the ratio of the standard deviations of parent and offspring log income, changes in the variance of income between generations will “mechanically” affect the elasticity but not the correlation. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that the latter is to be preferred, while others prefer the elasticity precisely because it incorporates changes in inequality (for example, Mitnik et al. 2014), thus expressing how consequential parents are for their offspring.
The Spearman rank correlation instead measures the extent to which offspring income tends to increase with parental income, without requiring that relationship to be loglinear. By abstracting from any distributional differences between generations, the rank correlation takes the standardization implied by the Pearson correlation one step further. Accordingly, conceptual arguments for or against the Pearson correlation vis-a-vis the elasticity extend to rank-based measures, although in a more extreme fashion.
We can decompose the joint distribution of parent and offspring income into (1) the copula, or, in other words, the joint distribution of their ranks, and (2) the two marginal distributions of income. The elasticity and Pearson correlation depend on both components, whereas the rank correlation only depends on the copula. While copula-based measures of mobility provide a clean characterization of mobility, their scale-invariant interpretation can be unappealing. For example, moving ten percentiles in the income distribution is significantly more meaningful in terms of changes in living standard in a high-inequality than in a low-inequality country. The usage of rank-based measures also can be motivated by practical features. For example, the conditional expectation of offspring on parent rank may be quite linear, and is then well suited to summarize differences in mobility across subgroups of a population (see Chetty et al. 2014a).
While useful for summarizing mobility in a single parameter, these three measures have the obvious drawback in not being informative about nonlinearities in mobility. However, much of the popular interest in mobility is motivated by concerns about specific elements of the joint distribution, such as on the persistence at the very top or bottom (“poverty traps”) or on the probability to rise from the bottom to the top (“rags to riches”). Researchers therefore also estimate transition matrices that capture mobility across quantile-based income classes, often termed transition probabilities (Zimmerman 1992; Jäntti et al. 2006). This approach amounts to aggregating specific subsets of the joint distribution of income ranks and converges to a fully nonparametric analysis of the copula as finer and finer classes are distinguished.
III. Data
We use data from two administrative registers, put together by Statistics Sweden: the multigenerational register, from which we have access to a random sample of the Swedish population, including their biological parents, and the income register, from which we have access to income data originating from tax assessments. Specifically, we use as our measure total (pretax) income, which is the sum of an individual’s labor earnings (and labor-related benefits), early-age pensions, and net income from business and capital realizations.1 We include sons born 1952–57 with fathers born 1927–41. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the cohort distribution of fathers and sons in the main sample. We have access to income data for the years 1960–2007 and we restrict the sample to fathers and sons with positive income in at least ten years.
Our main sample (used in Sections IVand V) consists of 6,523 father–son pairs, with sons’ (fathers’) income measured from age 22 to age 50 (aged 33–60), irrespective of birth years. We divide the sum of real annual incomes by the number of nonmissing income years and take the logs of those values. Mean log annualized lifetime income of sons (fathers) is 12.25 (12.23) with a standard deviation of 0.44 (0.43). For our analyses of Pearson correlations, we standardize log annual and lifetime incomes by birth year. Income ranks are computed from absolute levels, thus also including those who report zero income. Similar to above, we compute annual and lifetime income ranks separately by birth year.2 For our nonlinear analyses in Section V.D we use an extended sample for which we restrict the income streams to 1968–2007. The main difference in this sample is that incomes of fathers now are observed from age 41 to 60. All other sample criteria and variable definitions are held constant. The extended sample consists of 65,778 father–son pairs, and the mean of log annualized lifetime income of sons (fathers) is 12.25 (12.25) with a standard deviation of 0.44 (0.44). Overall, these data offer a unique possibility to examine the robustness of different measures of intergenerational mobility using nearly career-long income histories for two linkable generations.3
IV. Empirical Strategy and Basic Results
Let log lifetime incomes of parents and children, x* and y*, be expressed as deviations from generational means. The unconditional population relationship between x* and y* can be summarized using different measures, such as the intergenerational elasticity (the slope coefficient in the regression of y* on x*), Pearson or Spearman correlations, or rank-based transition probabilities. But in applications we typically only observe short-run incomes
with u and v being approximation errors. Those proxies are often based on only a few annual observations.
Our empirical approach is straightforward. We compare benchmark estimates that are based on the observed long-run incomes with age-specific estimates based on annual incomes for one or both generations. We focus first on “left-side” measurement error (in y*), using annual income for sons but lifetime income for fathers.4 Figure 1 presents our basic empirical findings. For each of the four measures it plots the benchmark estimate (solid line) against age-specific estimates based on annual incomes for offspring (dashed line). The main commonality across all measures is that they severely understate dependence at young ages. As individuals with high lifetime income tend to have low income at young age, for example due to accumulation of human capital, neither log linear nor rank-based dependence measures are well approximated before the early 30s.5 In contrast, the degree and direction of bias at later ages differs a lot.
Notes: Each figure plots the benchmark estimate based on lifetime incomes for both generations against estimates based on annual income of sons (left-hand side measurement error). The sample and thus the benchmark estimates vary over age as we drop persons with missing annual observations also for estimation of the benchmark. For ease of exposition confidence intervals of the benchmark estimates are not plotted. (They are similar to or slightly smaller in size than those of the age-specific estimates.)
Elasticity estimates suffer strongly from life-cycle effects: Increasing almost monotonically over age, they substantially overstate dependence at later ages. Consistent with previous work, life-cycle bias is minimized when incomes are observed around midage (see Grawe 2006; Haider and Solon 2006). But the slope of annual estimates over age can be steep; between age 30 and 50, they double from about 0.2 to 0.4 in our data. The log-linear and rank correlations are much less sensitive to life-cycle effects. The log linear correlation increases only slightly between age 30 and 50, while the rank correlation is remarkably stable.6 Its gradual decline in the late 40s, however, indicates that rank correlations may become less reliable when income is observed at late age.
As Figure 1 concerns left-side measurement error, elasticity estimates are not systematically attenuated (see next section). Classical errors do affect the other three measures, such that dependence continues to be understated through midage and beyond. However, attenuation is much weaker in the rank than in the log-linear correlation. The former is thus not only stable over age, but also much closer to the benchmark from about age 30. The remaining bias is dwarfed by that at early age or that in the log-linear measures, but it is not necessarily negligible: In midage it amounts to 5–10 percent of the benchmark. In the last panel we consider the probability of moving from the parental bottom to the offspring top quintile (“rags to riches”), as in Chetty et al. (2014a; 2014b). The results mirror those for the rank correlation: Mobility is strongly overstated before age 30, but rather accurately estimated and stable thereafter.
While Figure 1 reports age-specific estimates, it is common in the literature to pool income observations over multiple ages. Pooling over age yields a dependence measure that is approximately equal to the average of our estimates over the corresponding age range. As such, estimates will be sensitive to the age distribution in the analyzed sample. The inclusion of age controls in such pooled regression addresses only differences in mean income over age, and not the life-cycle variation in intergenerational dependence discussed here.
Although our evidence pertains to Sweden, the difference in the sensitivity of the various dependence measures stem from properties of the income process that are often generalizable, as we explain below. Our findings therefore suggest that positional measures can be useful for the analysis of income mobility if measurement is a major concern, which is often the case. We proceed with a more detailed formal and empirical treatment of each of the four measures.
V. Biases in Standard Measures of Income Dependence
A. The Elasticity
A useful way to summarize the intergenerational log-income relationship is the conditional expectation function (CEF). The coefficient from a linear regression of y* on x*,
provides the best (in a minimized mean squared error sense) linear approximation for its slope. Much of the literature concerns the estimation of this intergenerational elasticity.7 However, usage of short-run instead of true lifetime incomes yields a consistent estimator of
This coefficient may differ from the true elasticity for two reasons. First, it may be attenuated by classical measurement error. If u and v are assumed to be uncorrelated to true values and each other, Equation 3 reduces to the textbook errors-in-variables formula
, where rrx = Var(x*)/[Var(x*) + Var(u)]. Elasticity estimates based on annual incomes can thus be corrected for classical error if plausible estimates of rrx are available. Importantly, only classical error in parental income generates such attenuation bias. In addition, heterogeneity in income profiles may cause the covariance between error and true values to vary systematically over age, introducing life-cycle bias (Jenkins 1987; Haider and Solon 2006).
As we considered left-hand side measurement error, the bias shown in Figure 1 is exclusively due to life-cycle effects. Life-cycle bias is prone to rise with the age of offspring—going from negative to positive, crossing zero at some intermediate age—if those with higher lifetime incomes tend to have higher income growth rates, such that the dispersion of log income within each age group increases with age (Creedy 1988). But the evolution of cross-sectional inequality over age may differ across populations, making comparative analyses difficult.8 The attenuating effect of right-side measurement error is illustrated in Figure 2, which compares the benchmark elasticity against estimates based on annual incomes of sons at the specified age and fathers at age 45, with or without correction for attenuation bias using estimates of rrx. As expected, the estimates corrected for classical errors in Figure 2 are very similar to the estimates by age based directly on fathers’ lifetime measures in Figure 1. Figure A1 in the Appendix plots additional estimates based on multiyear average incomes to illustrate that this attenuation reduces only slowly if longer averages instead of single-year incomes are used (consistent with Mazumder 2005).
Notes: Each figure plots the benchmark estimate based on lifetime incomes for both generations against estimates based on annual income of sons (varying by age) and fathers’ income at age 45 (both-hand side measurement error). The sample and thus the benchmark estimates vary over age as we drop persons with missing annual observations also for estimation of the benchmark. Panels A–C additionally plot estimates by age that are adjusted using corrections for measurement error described in Section V. Estimates in Panels A and B are corrected for classical measurement error using reliability ratios computed directly in the data, while Panel C uses the correction factor provided by the generalized model in Equation 9.
B. The Log-Linear Correlation
The Pearson correlation coefficient,
, abstracts from changes in the variance of (log) income over generations. Under classical errors, the usage of proxy income yields
, with the reliability ratios rrx defined as above and
. Correlation estimates are thus attenuated by classical errors in both parent and offspring income, while only the former affects the elasticity. This distinction is of practical importance; correlation estimates are much lower than elasticity estimates under left-hand side measurement error (Figure 1) but more similarly attenuated under measurement error on both sides (Figure 2). While using multiyear averages for parents is now common practice when estimating the elasticity, it is for the correlation equally important also to address transitory noise in offspring income.
To our knowledge, no direct evidence exists on life-cycle effects in intergenerational correlations, but arguments made with respect to other measures can be adapted. Grawe (2006) and Haider and Solon (2006) document how the tendency of early-career (latecareer) income gaps to understate (overstate) lifetime differences generate life-cycle bias in elasticity estimates. Following Haider and Solon, capture this insight in the linear projection y = λy* + w and assume that w is uncorrelated to x*, such that
We can illustrate some new insights by rewriting Equation 4
Correlation estimates should thus be sensitive to life-cycle bias at very early ages, where differences in current and lifetime income can be negatively correlated, such that λ < 0. We expect less sensitivity at mid and late age: As correlations are invariant to positive monotone linear transformations of the variables, λ > 0 only enters the reliability ratio. The ratio goes to zero as λ → 0 or one as λ→∞. While correlation estimates are thus expected to increase with λ over age, they should, in contrast to the elasticity, remain attenuated also at later ages.
Our empirical findings support these implications. Correlation estimates suffer from strong life-cycle bias at young age but remain comparatively stable beyond age 30, under both left (Figure 1) and both-side (Figure 2) measurement error. Interestingly, correcting for classical errors using estimates of rrx and rry, while indeed addressing attenuation, also escalates life-cycle effects. Equation 5 provides an explanation: the reliability ratio tends to rise with λ and thus with age, such that estimates based on a classical errors-in-variables model understate this ratio at late ages. Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates that estimates of the Pearson correlation remain strongly attenuated even when five- and nine-year averages instead of annual incomes are used.
C. The Rank Correlation
Denote the ranks (normalized to the unit interval) of x* and y* in their respective distribution by
and
. Denote observed ranks by
where
are the errors in ranks. The Spearman rank correlation,
measures the extent to which one variable tends to increase with the other, without requiring that relationship to be linear.
Classical measurement error attenuates log-linear measures through its effect on the variance of observed incomes, but the variances of observed and true ranks are by definition equal. The distribution of a rank-ordered variable is uniform and, as of the normalization to the unit interval, has a variance of 1/12. However, even errors that are random in the underlying values generate nonclassical errors in ranks: as top (bottom) ranks cannot be overstated (understated), the correlation between errors in ranks and true ranks is negative.9 Formally, we have
, and thus
. Appendix Figure A2, Panel A provides an illustration by plotting the mean of the errorev at age 30 (that is, the deviation of annual from lifetime rank) separately for each five-percentile bin in the distribution of true ranks
. As at other ages, the relationship is systematic and strongly negative.
A textbook errors-in-variables model is therefore not suitable for ranks. To capture the relationship between observed and true ranks we instead adapt the model proposed by Haider and Solon (2006) to formulate a generalized errors-in-variables model in ranks. Let
where λy is the slope coefficient in a linear projection of
. By construction,
is uncorrelated to
, and we maintain the simplifying assumption that it is likewise uncorrelated to
. From the definition of ranks it follows that λy £ 1. This slope coefficient provides a linear representation of the expected measurement error in
as a function of
. A λy close to one implies very little measurement error, whereas a λy close to zero implies that
carries virtually no information about
. Let λx denote the analogous slope coefficient in a projection of
.
As noted above, Haider and Solon proposed this generalization of the textbook errors–invariables model to capture a particular form of nonclassical measurement error in log incomes. But the model can provide a useful summary also of the distribution of errors in income ranks. First, it captures in a parsimonious way that true values and errors must be negatively correlated in ranks; the slope coefficient λy will be less than one under any form of measurement error.10 In particular, in ranks the generalized is more suitable than the textbook model even when the underlying errors in log values are classical. Second, the linear functional form describes the distribution of ranks quite well. Appendix Figure A2 illustrates these points by plotting the mean deviation of income at age 30 from lifetime income against the latter, for both ranks (Panel A) and log income (Panel B). As at other ages, the linear functional form of the generalized errorsin- variables model provides a better fit in ranks than in log income.
Under errors on the left side, we then have
where we substituted Equation 9 and simplified. As λy < 1 (see Footnote 10), the rank correlation is understated. The case with right-side errors is analogous, and with errors on both sides we have
As the Pearson correlation, the Spearman correlation is thus subject to attenuation bias from errors in both parental and offspring income. But is it less or more attenuated? Whereas rank correlations are less sensitive to outliers in the tails of the distribution, and to the treatment of zero incomes in particular, it does not necessarily follow that they are generally less sensitive to measurement error.11 However, the probability density function of the errors in log income is negatively skewed in our data (and in other populations; see Guvenen et al. 2015), with frequent extreme (low-income) observations in the far left tail. Their influence is limited in ranks but large in logs.12 Rank correlations are thus expected to be less attenuated than log-linear measures.
Moreover, while the Pearson correlation is invariant to a linear spread in log-income profiles over age, the rank correlation is invariant to any rank-preserving spread. We may thus expect that life-cycle bias is even less problematic for the Spearman than for the Pearson correlation.
The results in Figures 1 and 2 support both these arguments. The gap between benchmark and annual estimates is substantially smaller for the rank correlation than the log-linear measures of dependence, and between the early 30s and the late 40s amounts to about 10 percent or less (left-side measurement error, Figure 1) or 20 percent or less (errors on both sides, Figure 2) of the benchmark. And while the rank correlation is strongly underestimated at young ages, as those with high lifetime income tend to have relatively low income (ranks) at the beginning of their career, it is less affected by lifecycle effects at later ages. The slope of annual estimates over age is nearly flat around midage, in stark contrast in particular to the intergenerational elasticity. However, these findings do not imply that measurement error is not a concern. Rank correlations remain attenuated even when multiyear averages instead of single-year incomes are used (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), although the bias turns negligible when long averages around midage are used. In addition, even small biases can be a concern if those correlations tend to vary less across groups than log-linear measures. For example, in their comparison of income mobility in the United States, Canada, and Sweden, Corak, Lindquist, and Mazumder (2014) report estimates that vary between 0.25 and 0.40 for the elasticity but only between 0.24 and 0.30 for the Spearman rank correlation. Even small biases thus still can be consequential for comparative purposes.
Equations 10 and 11 also point toward a procedure to reduce attenuation bias in rank correlations that may be useful in applied research. As errors in ranks are negatively correlated to true rank, standard methods do not apply.13 However, we argued that the generalized errors-in-variables model in ranks captures this negative relationship well, and therefore can be used to correct for the attenuation bias if estimates of λx and λy at the right age are available. Figure 2 provides such correction based on direct estimates of Equation 9 and the corresponding equation for parents. While not eliminating (lifecycle) bias at young age, the correction yields estimates that are nearly equal to the benchmark from around age 30. The problem is then how to estimate these coefficients in real-world applications, when lifetime incomes are not observed in the intergenerational data.
One option is to import such estimates from external evidence, ideally from data covering a similar population as the one under study. In the absence of such data one can in principle import estimates from other populations. However, Haider and Solon (2006) advise caution in doing so for the generalized model in log incomes because data sources may not be comparable and life-cycle trajectories may differ between cohorts and countries. Indeed, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) find that this coefficient follows a different and steep age profile in a Swedish cohort (growing from 0.8 to 1.5 between age 30 and 50), which suggests that the usage of external estimates can lead to large errors. However, the situation is more favorable for the generalized model in ranks. We noted that ranks are less sensitive to life-cycle effects, and this is reflected also in the age pattern of λx and λy in our data (see Figure A3 in the Appendix). Estimates vary only between 0.7 and 0.9 between the early 30s and age 60, are close to 0.8 over most of this age range, and do not vary substantially between the two generations. A rule-of-thumb correction based on the generalized errors-in-variables model is therefore less sensitive to the precise age at measurement in the case of ranks than log incomes. However, differences between populations and income concepts still may matter. For example, the share of zeros is much higher in U.S. tax data than in the data that we use here, and we may plausibly expect λx and λy to be smaller in this case.
Alternatively, the coefficients λx and λy can be estimated if two income observations are available per person. The slope coefficient from a regression of an income rank observation
on another observation
equals
such that the square of this coefficient will eliminate bias if the errors
and
are uncorrelated.14 Right-side or both-side measurement error can be treated accordingly. Of course, in practice the errors are possibly serially correlated (see Mazumder 2005), and the intergenerational process also may violate the assumption that they are uncorrelated to
. The correction will therefore not be exact in practice. However, as shown in Figure 3, we find that its application based on consecutive income observations still reduces the bias on average by more than 50 percent between age 30 and 50.15 The bias is not fully eliminated because the errors
and
are positively (serially) correlated, such that an estimate of λ based on Equation 12 is biased upward. Usage of more distant observations will reduce this bias, but in our data the correlation between the errors turns slightly negative when ten-year distances are used, leading to an overcorrection of the bias. To remain conservative, it is thus advisable to use observations that are not more than a few years apart.
Notes: The figure plots the benchmark estimate based on lifetime incomes for both generations against estimates based on annual income of sons (varying by age). Using two consecutive income observations, we compare estimates based on the rank of the two-year average with estimates that are based on the formal correction procedure that we describe in Section V. The sample and thus the benchmark estimates vary slightly over age as we drop persons with missing annual observations also for estimation of the benchmark.
Figure 2 also shows that the formal correction based on two adjacent observations produces better results than using simple averages of these observations. However, it does not address the bias at younger ages, where nonclassical errors from life-cycle effects are the main concern. The procedure is therefore most useful if two prime-age income observations per individual are available, as is quite often the case in modern survey data sets.
D. Transition Matrices and Copula
To further characterize the joint distribution of parent and child income, researchers often estimate transition matrices that capture mobility across quantile-based income classes (Zimmerman 1992; Jäntti et al. 2006). Interest often centers on specific elements, for example, on the persistence in the very top or bottom (such as “poverty traps”) or on the probability to rise from the lowest to the highest class (“rags to riches”). With sufficient data we can distinguish more classes and thus approximate the copula, the joint distribution of parent and child percentile ranks r = 1‚ ::: ‚ 100. As the copula is a key determinant of any mobility measure (see Chetty et al. 2014a; 2014b), it is valuable in a wide range of applications. However, little is known about the estimability of intergenerational copulas and transition matrices in short income data. Dahl and DeLeire (2008) note that transition matrices vary less across studies and samples than estimates of the elasticity, suggesting that they may be less sensitive to sampling choices. Still, simulations by O’Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2007) suggest that the bias can become more severe in the tails of the distribution.
Assume that only a short-run income measure is observed for each offspring. Using the law of total probability, we can rewrite the probability that its rank is equal to i conditional on the true parent rank being j as
Assuming that the error in log offspring income is classical, we have
. Bayes theorem implies that
, and thus
where the first right-hand term is the true probability and the second term is the bias. For illustration, consider a transition probability on the main diagonal (i = j), such that
The terms in square brackets are always negative if
—that is, if the probability for offspring to have a certain rank is largest when their parent has the same rank. This assumption appears reasonable and does indeed hold in our data, as shown below. We thus have
: the diagonal elements of a transition matrix are understated under classical errors. It follows that off-diagonal elements are on average overstated, as was the case for the bottom-to-top transition probability considered in Figures 1 and 2. Moreover, we may expect considerable differences within each category. The bias will tend to be larger in the corners of the transition matrix if
is particularly large for i = 1 (where ranks are bounded from below) or i = 100 (ranks bounded from above), and
decreases in the difference between r and i. And given the frequent occurrence of low-income observations in annual incomes we expect that long-distance transitions such as top to bottom are overestimated to a larger degree.
These theoretical predictions suggest that the observed robustness of rank correlations may not necessarily extend to other rank-based measures. We can test each of them by estimating the copula of parent and offspring incomes. Analysis of the full distribution is data intensive. Our sample size can be increased tenfold if we measure parental incomes from 1968 instead of 1960, such that father’s incomes are observed only from age 41 onward (see Section III). For the nonlinear analysis this tradeoff is worth while, in particular since income ranks are robust to monotone spreads of income profiles over the life cycle.16
Consider first if usage of annual income observations misrepresents the conditional expectation of offspring rank. Figure 4 plots the benchmark estimate of the conditional expectation (black line) against estimates based on annual income for sons at ages 25, 30, and 40 (Panel A) and annual incomes for both fathers and sons (Panel B). In contrast to the pattern reported in Chetty et al. (2014a), the CEF is not linear in our data. Their argument that rank-rank are advantageous to log-log relationships because only the former are linear may therefore not extend to other populations or income definitions. In particular, our measure contains income from business and capital realizations, which may contribute to the shape of the rank-rank relationship at the top. We find that parental rank is particularly consequential at the very top and bottom of the distribution. (See also Dahl and DeLeire 2008, who find a similar pattern for earnings in the United States.) For example, average offspring rank rises by four percentiles when moving from the secondhighest to the top percentile of parents; the increase is similarly steep when moving from the lowest to the second-lowest percentile. The CEF has a much lower slope in between the tails, pointing to particular mechanisms of income transmission among the very poorest and richest.17
Notes: Figures plot son’s expected rank in the income distribution conditional on father’s rank (in percentiles). The series are based on sons’ and fathers’ lifetime income (black solid line), sons’ annual incomes and fathers’ lifetime income (left-side measurement error, Panel A), or fathers’ income at age 45 (both-side measurement error, Panel B). We distinguish between estimates based on son’s income at age 25, at age 30, and at age 40. For ease of exposition we plot the rolling average over three percentiles of fathers’ rank.
Figure 4a shows that the CEF is poorly approximated by annual incomes at age 25, while over a wide range of percentiles it is well approximated already at age 30. However, not in the tails: average offspring rank is understated (overstated) by up to 10 percent in the top (bottom) five percentiles of the parent distribution. The underestimation in the top becomes negligible when incomes around age 40 are used. In contrast, the prospects of the very poorest are consistently overestimated across all ages in our data. These patterns are amplified when only short snapshots are observed for both generations. Figure 4b plots estimates based on annual income of sons and fathers at age 45. Average offspring rank is now overstated by about 30 percent in the bottom percentiles of the parent distribution. Because even parents with high lifetime income can occasionally have very low annual incomes, it is particularly hard to identify those fathers with the lowest lifetime incomes from short income spans; the CEF is particularly biased in this range.18
Figure 5 plots the copula of parent and offspring long-run incomes. The density is highest along the diagonal: As assumed in our derivation above, the likeliest position in the income distribution of children is the position of their parents. Because ranks are bounded, this probability is particularly high for the offspring with the very poorest and (especially) richest parents. The probability to reach the top percentile in the income distribution if the father was in the top percentile is 12.3 percent in our sample; their probability to reach the top five percentiles is above 37 percent. To yield a sensible scaling for the rest of the copula we thus censored the top percentile in Figure 5.
Notes: The figure plots the copula, the joint density distribution of son’s and father’s income ranks (in percentiles), using lifetime incomes for both generations based on 20 × 20 data points, interpolated. Under statistical independence each cell has expected density 0.25 and color light grey. Dark grey and black indicates excess densities, while light grey and white indicates densities that are lower than what we would have under independence. Densities along the diagonal capture immobility, off-diagonal densities mobility.
Figure 6 illustrates the bias that results from using annual income for sons at age 40 (Panel A) or annual incomes for both sons (at age 40) and fathers at age 45 (Panel B). To illustrate its size, the difference between the annual-based and the benchmark copula is expressed as a fraction of the cell probability that is expected under statistical independence. A number of patterns emerge. First, usage of annual incomes leads to underestimation along and overestimation away from the diagonal—in line with our theoretical arguments. Second, the biases are largest in magnitude in the tails of the distribution. While the inheritances of poverty and top incomes are often of particular interest, their estimates are also the most inaccurate in short data. Our findings are thus consistent with simulation results by O’Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2007), who suggest that classical measurement error leads to overestimation of mobility in particular in the tails of the distribution. Considerably mismeasured is also the extent of long-distance downward mobility. As even sons from top-income parents have occasionally low annual incomes, their probability to fall to the bottom is substantially overstated in annual data.19 We thus find that the effect of measurement error on the copula has a quite logical structure. Researchers need to exercise particular caution when studying long-distance mobility, the inheritance of poverty, or the inheritance of top incomes.
Notes: The figures plot the biases in the copula, the joint density distribution of son’s and father’s income ranks (in blocks of five percentiles each, interpolated). We use income at age 40 for sons and lifetime income (leftside measurement error, Panel A) or income at age 45 (both-side measurement error, Panel B) for fathers. The color intensity indicates the magnitude of the bias, that is, the density difference compared to when lifetime incomes are used for both generations. For comparability across the copula, we scale the density difference in each 5x5 cell by the density that we would expect under statistical independence (1/400). For example, a density difference of 0.5 implies that the density was 1/800 higher in annual than in lifetime data.
VI. Conclusions
We examine attenuation and life-cycle bias in four widely used measures of intergenerational dependence using nearly complete lifetime income histories of Swedish fathers and sons. As summarized in Table 1, we find that dependence (mobility) is severely understated (overstated) in all measures if snapshots of income are observed before age 30. In contrast, the degree and direction of bias differs substantially at later ages. Elasticity estimates suffer strongly from life-cycle bias. Log-linear (Pearson) correlations are more stable over age but also severely attenuated, even when multiyear average incomes are used. Although corrections for classical measurement error reduce attenuation, they may escalate life-cycle effects.
Positional measures such as the rank correlation and transition probabilities fare much better. Particularly encouraging is the stability over age of rank-based estimates once incomes are observed beyond age 30, a pattern also observed in U.S. data (Chetty et al. 2014a; Mazumder 2015). Although some attenuation bias remains, even single-year estimates understate persistence by less than 20 percent, which can be reduced further if multiple observations are available. However, as classical errors in underlying values turn nonclassical in ranks, standard correction procedures do not yield unbiased estimates. We proposed an alternative correction method that reduces attenuation more efficiently than a simple averaging of income observations. In summary, rank-based measures are particularly attractive when only few income observations per individual are available, or when the analysis puts large requirements on the data. Such cases include the study of mobility trends and cross-country comparisons based on data sets that differ in sampling or quality.
However, even rank-based measures can be quite inaccurate in the tails of the distribution, and those tails are often of special interest. Persistence in lifetime income is strikingly large in the very top and bottom of the distribution in our data, where a onepercentile increase in father’s rank can be associated with a four times larger rise in average offspring rank. Such nonlinearities are important; the top percentiles hold a disproportionally large share of total income in most countries, and we may care particularly about mobility among the poor, for whom small income changes can have large welfare implications. High persistence in the tails also may relate to certain mechanisms, such as the inheritance of firms, capital, and employers or, on the other end, credit constraints, and inheritance of long-term joblessness, poor skills, or health. Linear summary measures cannot capture such patterns. But our results suggest that even nonlinear analyses may fail to capture them, if based on short income data.
Fortunately, the sign and magnitude of bias across the joint distribution of ranks is quite systematic. Transition probabilities tend to be understated along the diagonal and overstated along the off-diagonal of the parent-offspring copula in annual estimates. Long-distance downward mobility can be highly overstated—sons of high-income parents do occasionally have low-income episodes, but those episodes are unlikely to extend over long spans. More generally, anyone may temporarily move into the bottom of the distribution, while the top is more persistently populated by a select few. It is thus not surprising that we find the largest bias in bottom-to-bottom transitions: the inheritance of poverty and the potential existence of “poverty traps” are understated in annual data.
Of course, robustness is only one factor in the choice of dependence measures in applications, and their conceptual relevance also needs to be considered. As described in Section II, the intergenerational elasticity is more “consequential”—it describes the rate at which incomes regress to the mean over generations—and can be derived as a reduced-form relationship from standard models of parental investments in offspring (Becker and Tomes 1979; Solon 2004). Rank-based measures instead have different implications depending on the underlying income distribution. For example, moving ten percentiles in a high-inequality country like the United States has other welfare implications than a comparable move in Sweden. We hope our findings help researchers to evaluate these tradeoffs between measurement and conceptual considerations, and encourage the use of rank-based measures as robust complements to the more traditional measures.
Appendix 1 Additional Tables and Figures
Cohort Distribution of Main Sample
Notes: Each figure plots the benchmark estimate based on lifetime incomes for both generations against estimates based on annual or average annual (log of five- or nine-year average) income of sons around age t and fathers’ annual or average annual income around age 45 (both-hand side measurement error). The sample and thus the benchmark estimates vary over age as we drop persons with missing annual observations also for estimation of the benchmark.
Notes: The figures plot the conditional expectation of the difference in sons’ income at age 30 against their lifetime income for both income ranks (Panel A) and log income (Panel B), separately for each 5-percent bin in the distribution of lifetime incomes. The solid lines represent linear approximation of the conditional expectation function.
Notes: The figures plot the slope coefficient from separate regressions of income rank at age t on lifetime rank. (See Equation 9). The solid line plots these coefficients for sons (λy), dashed line for fathers (λx).
Footnotes
↵1. We use total income since it is the income measure that is available over the longest time period. Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) showthat the life-cycle profiles of the elasticity between current and lifetime measures for total income and labor earnings are very similar.
↵2. The share of nonpositive incomes is around 1 percent at most ages, and slightly higher for young and old sons. It is substantially lower than the corresponding shares found in U.S. administrative data used by Chetty et al. (2014a), likely because the declaration of taxable income is a requirement for eligibility to most social insurance programs in the Swedish system. Excluding these observations has little effect on our estimates of the rank correlation, but log-based dependence measures are somewhat sensitive to their inclusion (for example, by bottom-coding; see also Nybom and Stuhler 2016).
↵3. Much of the previous literature relies on survey instead of administrative data. Our central arguments on the relative sensitivity of different dependence measures to the usage of short income spans are not specific to any data source, but the magnitude of the bias will depend on the properties of the underlying data and income process. For example, survey data may have certain comparative advantages (such as a more comprehensive income definition) and disadvantages (such as response error in annual incomes themselves) that we do not discuss here (see for example Mazumder 2015).
↵4. For simplicity, we use the terminology “left-side” (for children) and “right-side” (for parents) measurement error not only for regression-based but for all measures.
↵5. This finding matters since the offspring in intergenerational data sets tend to be observed at younger ages. For example, Chetty et al. (2014b) measure income of children at age 29–30 or younger, while Pekkarinen, Salvanes, and Sarvimäki (forthcoming) measure at age 35.
↵6. The stability of estimates of the rank correlation supports arguments in Chetty et al. (2014a, 2014b), whose main analyses rely on short spans of income measured at around age 30 for children. Chetty et al. use an auxiliary data source to test for life-cycle bias, finding little trend in estimates between child age 30 and 40.
↵7. Mitnik et al. (2014) note that this regression does not estimate the elasticity of the conditional expectation of offspring income given parent income, but the conditional expectation of log offspring income given log parent income. Because the expectation of the log is not the log of the expectation, the former might differ from the latter. Mitnik et al. propose a way of measuring the elasticity of the conditional expectation function. (See also the online appendix of Chetty et al. 2014a.)We find the approximation biases from the usage of short income spans to be similar in both measures. (Results are available upon request.)
↵8. Chetty et al. (2014a) report elasticity estimates that stabilize around age 30, but Mazumder (2015) argues that their test suffers from data limitations. Grawe (2006), Nybom and Stuhler (2016), and Gregg, Macmillan, and Vittori (2017) find rather strong age dependency.
↵9. This argument is related to the case with classification errors in binary variables (Aigner 1973). For example, if y* and v follow independent normal distributions with
and
, then the rank of y* is
while its expected rank in the observed distribution equals
. The expected rank is below (above) the true rank if the latter is greater (smaller) than 0.5.↵10. In particular,
and from above
. For any measurement error,
and thus λy < 1.↵11. For example, if y* and x* are normally distributed, and observations close to the mean suffer most from measurement error, then the rank correlation can be more attenuated than the log-linear measures.
↵12. We have performed different types of regression diagnostics. First, we ran jackknife estimations for each measure. Indeed, the range of elasticity estimates, across replications when excluding one observation at a time, is more than 15 times larger than the corresponding range for the rank correlation. Second, we computed observationspecific influence statistics (so-called “dfbetas”), and found them to be stable across the distribution of errors in ranks, but very large in the lower part, low in the middle, and large in the top of the distribution of errors in logs.
↵13. For example, instrumenting the regressor in a regression of observed rank
by a second observation
estimates
, eliminating bias only if λy = λx. However, Kitagawa, Nybomand Stuhler (2017) present an alternative correction method that is based on established small error variance approximation techniques.↵14. The estimation of the generalized errors-in-variablesmodel in ranks fromtwo income observations is feasible because the variances of observed and true ranks are equal by definition, such that their ratio cancels out in Equation 12. For log income, the corresponding ratio would be unobserved, differ from one, and vary with age.
↵15. We use two adjacent income observations, such that
, to retrieve estimates of
for each age t of the offspring. For fathers we use annual incomes at age 45 and 46. This is in contrast to Figure 2, in which we estimated Equation 9 directly using lifetime ranks.↵16. In our data, the correlation of “complete” lifetime measures of income rank over age 25–65 with shorter measures over age 33–60 is about 0.96, and about 0.91 over age 41–60.
↵17. One particular example is Corak and Piraino (2010), who illustrate that the transmission of employers at the top of the income distribution is remarkably high in Canada. Björklund, Roine, and Waldenström (2012) also find that the intergenerational elasticity is very high among the top 0.1 percent in Sweden.
↵18. In fact, the observed mean rank of sons from the lowest percentile of fathers is higher than the mean for the next few percentiles. The reason for such temporary low-income spans can be manifold; high income earners could choose leisure and live off their wealth, they could earn their income abroad or for other reasons avoid domestic taxation, and so on. Their frequency and thus the error from using annual data thus also are likely to vary across data sources (such as survey or tax-based administrative data) and income definitions. In contrast, we do not occasionally observe very high annual incomes for those with low lifetime incomes.
↵19. This problem would be of even greater concern when incomes are recorded as shorter snapshots (such as weekly or monthly), as is the case in some survey-based data sources.
- Received July 2015.
- Accepted April 2016.



























