Skip to main content

Main menu

  • Home
  • Content
    • Current
    • Ahead of print
    • Archive
    • Supplementary Material
  • Info for
    • Authors
    • Subscribers
    • Institutions
    • Advertisers
  • About Us
    • About Us
    • Editorial Board
  • Connect
    • Feedback
    • Help
    • Request JHR at your library
  • Alerts
  • Call for Editor
  • Free Issue
  • Special Issue
  • Other Publications
    • UWP

User menu

  • Register
  • Subscribe
  • My alerts
  • Log in
  • My Cart

Search

  • Advanced search
Journal of Human Resources
  • Other Publications
    • UWP
  • Register
  • Subscribe
  • My alerts
  • Log in
  • My Cart
Journal of Human Resources

Advanced Search

  • Home
  • Content
    • Current
    • Ahead of print
    • Archive
    • Supplementary Material
  • Info for
    • Authors
    • Subscribers
    • Institutions
    • Advertisers
  • About Us
    • About Us
    • Editorial Board
  • Connect
    • Feedback
    • Help
    • Request JHR at your library
  • Alerts
  • Call for Editor
  • Free Issue
  • Special Issue
  • Follow uwp on Twitter
  • Follow JHR on Bluesky
Research ArticleArticles

Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance

Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Brazil

Braz Camargo, Rafael Camelo, Sergio Firpo and Vladimir Ponczek
Journal of Human Resources, March 2018, 53 (2) 414-444; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.53.2.0115-6868R1
Braz Camargo
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Rafael Camelo
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Sergio Firpo
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Vladimir Ponczek
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
  • For correspondence: vladimir.ponczek{at}fgv.br
  • Article
  • Figures & Data
  • Supplemental
  • Info & Metrics
  • References
  • PDF
Loading

References

  1. ↵
    1. Andrabi Tahhir,
    2. Das Jishnu,
    3. Khwaja Asim Ijaz
    . 2017. “Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test-Scores on Educational Markets”. American Economic Review 107(6):1535–63.
    OpenUrl
  2. ↵
    1. Bacolod Marigee,
    2. DiNardo John,
    3. Jacobson Mireille
    . 2009. “Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively?” NBER Working Paper 14775. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  3. ↵
    1. Black Sandra E.
    1999. “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2):577–99.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  4. ↵
    1. Calonico Sebastian,
    2. Cattaneo Matias D.,
    3. Titiunik Rocio
    . 2014a. “Robust Data-Driven Inference in the Regression-Discontinuity Design.” Stata Journal 14(4):909–46.
    OpenUrl
  5. ↵
    1. Calonico Sebastian,
    2. Cattaneo Matias D.,
    3. Titiunik Rocio
    . 2014b. “Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression Discontinuity Design”. Econometrica 82(6):2295–326.
    OpenUrlCrossRef
  6. ↵
    1. Calonico Sebastian,
    2. Cattaneo Mattias D.,
    3. Farrel Max H.,
    4. Titiunik Rocio
    . 2016. “Regression Discontinuity Designs Using Covariates.” CeMMAP Working Paper 37/15. Ann Arbor, MI: Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
  7. ↵
    1. Chiang Hanley
    . 2009. “How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement”. Journal of Public Economics 93(9–10):1045–57.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  8. ↵
    1. Costa Gilvan L.M.
    2013. “O Ensino Medio no Brasil: Desafios a Matricula e ao Trabalho Docente”. Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos 94(236):185–210.
    OpenUrl
  9. ↵
    1. Dee Thomas,
    2. Jacob Brian
    . 2009. “The Impact of No Child center Behind on Student Achievement.” NBER Working Paper 15531. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  10. ↵
    1. Fack Gabrielle,
    2. Grenet Julien
    . 2010. “When Do Better Schools Raise Housing Prices? Evidence from Paris Public and Private Schools”. Journal of Public Economics 94(1–2):59–77.
    OpenUrlCrossRef
  11. ↵
    1. Figlio David,
    2. Loeb Susanna
    . 2011. “School Accountability.” In Handbook of the Economics of Education, ed. Hanushek Erik, Machin Stephen, Woessmann Ludger, 383–421. New York: Elsevier.
  12. ↵
    1. Figlio David,
    2. Kenny Lawrence
    . 2009. “Public Sector Performance Measurement and Stakeholder Support”. Journal of Public Economics 93(9–10):1069–77.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  13. ↵
    1. Figlio David,
    2. Lucas Maurice
    . 2004. “What’s in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market”. American Economic Review 94(3):591–604.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  14. ↵
    1. Firpo Sergio,
    2. Pieri Renan,
    3. Souza Andre P.
    2017. “Electoral Impacts of Uncovering Public School Quality: Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities”. EconomiA 18(1):1–17.
    OpenUrl
  15. ↵
    1. Firpo Sergio,
    2. Possebom Vitor,
    3. Ponczek Vladimir
    . 2014. “Information and Prices on Private Education Market.” IZA Discussion Paper 8476. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor.
  16. ↵
    1. Hanushek Eric,
    2. Raymond Margaret E.
    2005. “Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24(2):297–327.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  17. ↵
    1. Hastings Justine S.,
    2. Weinstein Jeffrey M.
    2008. “Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(4):1373–414.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  18. ↵
    1. Hastings Justine S.,
    2. Weelden Richard van,
    3. Weinstein Jeffrey
    . 2007. “Preferences, Information, and Parental Choice Behavior in Public School Choice.” NBER Working Paper 12995. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  19. ↵
    1. Hussain Iftikhar
    . 2009. “Essays in Household Economics and Economics of Education.” Ph.D. Thesis. University College London.
  20. ↵
    1. Koning Pierre,
    2. van der Wiel Karen
    . 2012. “School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands”. De Economist 160(4):339–55.
    OpenUrl
  21. ↵
    1. Koning Pierre,
    2. Wiel Karen van der
    . 2013. “Ranking the Schools: How School-Quality Information Affects School Choice in The Netherlands”. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2):466–93.
    OpenUrl
  22. ↵
    1. Mizala Alejandra,
    2. Romaguera Pilar,
    3. Urquiola Miguel
    . 2007. “Socioeconomic Status or Noise? Tradeoffs in the Generation of School Quality Information”. Journal of Development Economics 84(1):61–75.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  23. ↵
    1. Mizala Alejandra,
    2. Urquiola Miguel
    . 2009. “Parental Choice and School Markets: The Impact of Information Approximating School Effectiveness.” Documentos de Trabajo 239. Santiago: Centro de Economia Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  24. ↵
    1. Muralidharan Karthik,
    2. Sundararaman Venkatesh
    . 2011. “Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India”. Journal of Political Economy 119(1):39–77.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  25. ↵
    1. Rockoff Jonah,
    2. Turner Lesley J.
    2010. “Short-Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(4):119–47.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  26. ↵
    1. Rouse Cecilia E.,
    2. Hannaway Jane,
    3. Goldhaber Dan,
    4. Figlio David
    . 2013. “Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5(2):251–81.
    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
  27. ↵
    1. Wolinsy Asher
    . 1983. “Prices as Signals of Product Quality.” Review of Economic Studies 50(2):647–58.
    OpenUrlCrossRef
PreviousNext
Back to top

In this issue

Journal of Human Resources: 53 (2)
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 53, Issue 2
31 Mar 2018
  • Table of Contents
  • Table of Contents (PDF)
  • Index by author
  • Back Matter (PDF)
  • Front Matter (PDF)
Print
Download PDF
Article Alerts
Sign In to Email Alerts with your Email Address
Email Article

Thank you for your interest in spreading the word on Journal of Human Resources.

NOTE: We only request your email address so that the person you are recommending the page to knows that you wanted them to see it, and that it is not junk mail. We do not capture any email address.

Enter multiple addresses on separate lines or separate them with commas.
Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance
(Your Name) has sent you a message from Journal of Human Resources
(Your Name) thought you would like to see the Journal of Human Resources web site.
Citation Tools
Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance
Braz Camargo, Rafael Camelo, Sergio Firpo, Vladimir Ponczek
Journal of Human Resources Mar 2018, 53 (2) 414-444; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.53.2.0115-6868R1

Citation Manager Formats

  • BibTeX
  • Bookends
  • EasyBib
  • EndNote (tagged)
  • EndNote 8 (xml)
  • Medlars
  • Mendeley
  • Papers
  • RefWorks Tagged
  • Ref Manager
  • RIS
  • Zotero
Share
Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance
Braz Camargo, Rafael Camelo, Sergio Firpo, Vladimir Ponczek
Journal of Human Resources Mar 2018, 53 (2) 414-444; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.53.2.0115-6868R1
Twitter logo Facebook logo Mendeley logo
  • Tweet Widget
  • Facebook Like
  • Google Plus One
Bookmark this article

Jump to section

  • Article
    • Abstract
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Institutional Background and Data
    • III. Empirical Strategy
    • IV. Empirical Results
    • V. Discussion
    • VI. Conclusion
    • Appendix
    • Acknowledgments
    • Footnotes
    • References
  • Figures & Data
  • Supplemental
  • Info & Metrics
  • References
  • PDF

Related Articles

  • Google Scholar

Cited By...

  • Can Public Rankings Improve School Performance?: Evidence from a Nationwide Reform in Tanzania
  • Google Scholar

More in this TOC Section

  • What Knox Achieved
  • How Do Mass Shootings Affect Community Well-Being?
  • Early-Life Exposure to the Great Depression and Long-Term Health and Economic Outcomes
Show more Articles

Similar Articles

Keywords

  • I20
  • I21
UW Press logo

© 2025 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

Powered by HighWire