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Research ArticleArticles
Open Access

Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law

Suresh Naidu and Eric A. Posner
Journal of Human Resources, April 2022, 57 (S) S284-S323; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10030R1
Suresh Naidu
Suresh Naidu is at Columbia University.
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Eric A. Posner
Eric A. Posner is at University of Chicago.
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Journal of Human Resources: 57 (S)
Journal of Human Resources
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Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner
Journal of Human Resources Apr 2022, 57 (S) S284-S323; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10030R1

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Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner
Journal of Human Resources Apr 2022, 57 (S) S284-S323; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10030R1
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  • Article
    • Abstract
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Why Jobs Are Not like Widgets: Markets for Labor versus Markets for Commodities
    • III. Implications for Antitrust Law
    • IV. An Inventory of Law and Policy Tools for Labor Market Monopsony
    • V. Conclusion
    • Footnotes
    • References
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Keywords

  • J42
  • L4
  • K21
  • K31
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