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Research ArticleArticles
Open Access

Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector

Alan B. Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter
Journal of Human Resources, April 2022, 57 (S) S324-S348; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483
Alan B. Krueger
Alan B. Krueger (deceased), formerly of Princeton University and NBER.
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Orley Ashenfelter
Orley Ashenfelter is at the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University and NBER ().
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  • For correspondence: [email protected]
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Article Information

vol. 57 no. S S324-S348
DOI 
https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483
Published By 
University of Wisconsin Press
Print ISSN 
0022-166X
Online ISSN 
1548-8004
History 
  • Received October 1, 2019
  • Accepted August 1, 2021
  • Published online March 21, 2022.

ARTICLE VERSIONS

  • Ahead of Print Version (Wednesday, October 13, 2021 - 10:29 AM).
  • You are viewing the final version of this article.
Copyright & Usage 
© 2022 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System This open access article is distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0) and is freely available online at: http://jhr.uwpress.org.

Author Information

  1. Alan B. Krueger and
  2. Orley Ashenfelter
  1. Alan B. Krueger (deceased), formerly of Princeton University and NBER.
  2. Orley Ashenfelter is at the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University and NBER (c6789{at}princeton.edu).
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Journal of Human Resources: 57 (S)
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 57, Issue S
1 Apr 2022
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Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
Alan B. Krueger, Orley Ashenfelter
Journal of Human Resources Apr 2022, 57 (S) S324-S348; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483

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Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
Alan B. Krueger, Orley Ashenfelter
Journal of Human Resources Apr 2022, 57 (S) S324-S348; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483
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Jump to section

  • Article
    • Abstract
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Data on Franchise “No-Poaching” Agreements
    • III. Theoretical Analysis of No-Poaching Agreements
    • IV. Correlates of No-Poaching Agreements
    • V. Conclusion
    • Appendix
    • Footnotes
    • References
  • Figures & Data
  • Info & Metrics
  • References
  • PDF

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