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Research ArticleArticles

Will You Marry Me, Later?

Age-of-Marriage Laws and Child Marriage in Mexico

View ORCID ProfileCristina Bellés-Obrero and View ORCID ProfileMaría Lombardi
Journal of Human Resources, January 2023, 58 (1) 221-259; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.58.3.1219-10621R2
Cristina Bellés-Obrero
Cristina Bellés-Obrero is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Economics at the University of Mannheim ().
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  • For correspondence: cbelleso{at}mail.uni-mannheim.de
María Lombardi
María Lombardi is an Assistant Professor in the School of Government at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
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  • Figure 1
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    Figure 1

    Progressive Adoption of the Child Marriage Ban

    Notes: This figure shows the evolution in the number of states that banned child marriages (solid line) and banned child marriages only for minors below the age of 16 (dashed line). We obtained the date of the reform for each state from the states’ civil and family codes.

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    Figure 2

    Evolution in the Share of Women Who Were Child Brides

    Notes: This graph depicts the share of women who were formally married and in an informal union before the age of 18, by their birth year. These two categories are mutually exclusive. Women in an informal union are those who had an informal union before the age of18 but did not get formally married by this age. The source of these data is the Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID), a demographic survey conducted in 2014. We took the sample of 83,554 women who were 20–54 at the time of the survey and computed the share of women in each category using sampling weights.

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    Figure 3

    Number of Registered Marriages per 1,000 Girls and Women of Each Age in 2013

    Notes: This figure depicts the number of legally registered marriages by the age of the bride, per 1,000 women and girls of each age in 2013. The number of marriages was obtained from marriage certificate microdata and the population from CONAPO.

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    Figure 4

    Cross-Country Comparison of the Norms around Informal Unions

    Notes: The data for this figure come from the fifth and sixth waves of the World Value Survey. For countries that participated in both waves, we use the most recent data. This graph displays the share of respondents ages 40 and older in each country who answered that they would not like to live next to an unmarried couple.

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    Figure 5

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Formal Marriage Rates of 16- and 17-Year-Old Girls

    Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. The figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on wild-bootstrap clustered standard errors of a regression in which the dependent variable is the monthly number of marriages with a bride ages 16–17 per 1,000 girls of this age who reside in state s in month–year t. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each month relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the month before the reform being the omitted category. We only report 12 lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and 24 lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than 24 months have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

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    Figure 6

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Formal Marriage Rates of 14- and 15-Year-Old Girls

    Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month-state. The figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on wild-bootstrap clustered standard errors of a regression in which the dependent variable is the monthly number of marriages with a bride ages 14–15 per 1,000 girls of this age who reside in state s in month–year t. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each month relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the month before the reform being the omitted category. We only report 12 lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and 24 lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than 24 months have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

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    Figure 7

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on School Attendance of 16- and 17-Year-Old Girls

    Notes: The sample is composed of all 16–17-year-old girls interviewed in ENOE in 2008–2018. This figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on wild-bootstrap clustered standard errors of a regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the girl attended school at the moment of the survey. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each quarter relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in the girl’s state of residence, with the quarter before the reform being the omitted category. We only report five lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and seven lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than seven quarters have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, quarter–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married, age dummies, and town-size dummies. These estimates are weighted using the sampling weights provided in ENOE. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

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    Figure 8

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Early Motherhood of 16- and 17-Year-Old Girls

    Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states from January 2008 to March 2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. This figure plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on wild-bootstrap clustered standard errors of a regression in which the dependent variable is the monthly number of (live) first births conceived in that month by girls ages 16–17, per 1,000 girls of this age who reside in that state. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each month relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the month before the reform being the omitted category. We only report 12 lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and 15 lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than 15 months have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

  • Figure 9
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    Figure 9

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Civil Status of 16–17-Year-Old Mothers

    Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. These figures plot the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on wild-bootstrap clustered standard errors of a regression in which the dependent variable is the share of first births delivered by girls ages 16–17 that are in a marriage and informal union at the moment of delivery, respectively. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each month relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the month before the reform being the omitted category. We only report 12 lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and 24 lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than 24 months have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, month–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Tables

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    Table 1

    Descriptive Statistics

    MeanSDMin.Max.N
    Dependent variables
     Formal child marriage rate (14–15)0.1960.3240.0002.7344,224
     Formal child marriage rate (16–17)1.1331.1460.0007.2964,224
     Attends school (14–15)0.8900.3130.0001.000329,765
     Attends school (16–17)0.7330.4420.0001.000329,566
     Child fertility rate (14–15)2.5980.5140.9395.4773,936
     Child fertility rate (16–17)5.4860.9151.4399.3633,936
    Independent variables
     Child marriage banned (14–15)0.4190.4930.0001.0004,224
     Child marriage banned (16–17)0.2170.4120.0001.0004,224
     Real average income of employed people1752.807494.197858.1443768.3274,224
     Poverty rate0.3870.1230.1150.7144,224
     Unemployment rate0.0430.0150.0080.0964,224
     Female labor force participation (ages 20 and older)0.4680.0530.2880.6074,224
     Total population (in ln)14.8430.74513.26416.6574,224
     State governor from PRI0.5400.4980.0001.0004,224
     State governor from PAN0.2370.4250.0001.0004,224
     State governor from PRD0.1710.3770.0001.0004,224
     Permission of judge/mayor required (14–15)0.4060.4910.0001.0004,224
     Permission of judge/mayor required (16–17)0.3330.4710.0001.0004,224
    • Notes: Except for the individual data on school attendance, the unit of observation for all variables is a month–state, and the sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018. Formal child marriage rate is the monthly number of marriages with a bride of the relevant age, per 1,000 girls of the corresponding age group that reside in that state, calculated using the marriage certificate microdata provided by INEGI and population estimates by CONAPO. Individual data on school attendance were obtained from ENOE, and the sample includes all girls who were 14–17 years old at the moment of the survey. Attends school is a dummy for whether the respondent, belonging to the corresponding age group, reported that she was attending school. Child fertility rate is the monthly number of first births conceived in that month per 1,000 girls of the corresponding age group that reside in that state, calculated using the birth registry microdata provided by SINAC and population estimates by CONAPO. Child marriage banned is a dummy variable taking the value of one if child marriage was banned, without exception, for the corresponding age group. The unemployment rate was obtained from INEGI, the poverty rate and average income of employed individuals from CONEVAL, the female labor force participation of women ages 20 and over from ENOE, and data on total population was obtained from ENOE. State governor from PRI is a dummy variable for whether the state governor belongs to the PRI political party. The analogous definition applies to the following two variables. Permission of judge/mayor required is a dummy variable for whether individuals of the corresponding age needed a judge or mayor to sign off on the marriage, in addition to the consent of their parents.

    • View popup
    Table 2

    Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Formal Child Marriage Rates

    (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
    Panel A: Ages 14–15
    Child marriage banned0.0070.010−0.063−0.089−0.097
    (0.131)(0.133)(0.093)(0.073)(0.093)
    [0.994][0.991][0.597][0.311][0.432]
    Observations4,2244,2244,2244,2244,224
    R20.2370.2560.5610.6380.623
    Dependent variable mean (control)0.2680.2680.2680.2680.258
    Panel B: Ages 16–17
    Child marriage banned−0.476***−0.445***−0.716***−0.695***−0.702***
    (0.156)(0.156)(0.178)(0.175)(0.154)
    [0.000][0.000][0.002][0.002][0.004]
    Observations4,2244,2244,2244,2244,224
    R20.3580.3940.7470.7610.766
    Dependent variable mean (control)1.4321.4321.4321.4321.352
    Year FE✓
    Month–year FE✓✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓
    Population weights✓
    • Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state.The dependent variable in Panel A (B) is the monthly number of marriages with a bride ages 14–15 (16–17) per 1,000 girls of this age who reside in that state. The regressor of interest is a dummy for whether child marriage was not allowed for the corresponding age group in that state and month. Controls include states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • * p < 0.10,

    • ** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 3

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Formal Child Marriage Rates

    Marriages per 1,000 Girls of Age
    14151617
    Child marriage banned
     Months [−12,9]0.0050.0010.0880.086
    (0.020)(0.041)(0.068)(0.079)
    [0.793][0.977][0.217][0.296]
     Months [−8,−5]−0.015−0.0260.0460.004
    (0.013)(0.020)(0.035)(0.059)
    [0.257][0.165][0.166][0.945]
     Months [0,3]−0.038**−0.110***−0.437***−0.571***
    (0.014)(0.035)(0.138)(0.148)
    [0.010][0.004][0.001][0.000]
     Months [4,7]−0.056**−0.151***−0.584***−0.748***
    (0.020)(0.047)(0.158)(0.171)
    [0.014][0.006][0.001][0.000]
     Months [8,11]−0.068**−0.177**−0.636***−0.818***
    (0.028)(0.061)(0.167)(0.184)
    [0.029][0.012][0.001][0.000]
     Months [12,15]−0.058−0.173**−0.670***−0.836***
    (0.033)(0.072)(0.175)(0.198)
    [0.133][0.048][0.001][0.000]
     Months [16,19]−0.055−0.184*−0.666***−0.830***
    (0.038)(0.084)(0.189)(0.217)
    [0.222][0.064][0.001][0.001]
     Months [20,23]−0.049−0.163−0.592***−0.761***
    (0.045)(0.095)(0.208)(0.244)
    [0.385][0.152][0.007][0.004]
    Month–year FE✓✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓✓✓
    Observations4,2244,2244,2244,224
    R20.5920.6500.7490.744
    Dependent variable mean (control)0.1360.3991.2371.628
    • Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. The dependent variable is the monthly number of marriages with a bride in the age group specified in the column header, per 1,000 girls of this age who reside in that state. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each four-month period relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for the relevant age group in state s, with the period before the reform being the omitted category. We only report lead coefficients for up to 12 months before the reform for ease of interpretation and lag coefficients for 23 months after the reform for simplicity and because there are few states for which more than 23 months have passed since the reform was enacted. Controls include states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 4

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on School Attendance of 16- and 17-Year-Old Girls

    Girls of Age
    16–171617
    Child marriage banned
     In 3 quarters−0.016**−0.012−0.019
    (0.007)(0.013)(0.016)
    [0.040][0.433][0.232]
     In 2 quarters−0.006−0.010−0.000
    (0.007)(0.008)(0.014)
    [0.405][0.246][0.988]
     This quarter0.0120.0150.008
    (0.007)(0.010)(0.010)
    [0.132][0.179][0.456]
     1 quarter ago0.003−0.0020.009
    (0.010)(0.010)(0.013)
    [0.772][0.861][0.485]
     2 quarters ago−0.002−0.0070.004
    (0.010)(0.012)(0.014)
    [0.888][0.575][0.758]
     3 quarters ago−0.0010.005−0.007
    (0.008)(0.009)(0.015)
    [0.869][0.588][0.644]
     4 quarters ago0.0020.012−0.006
    (0.010)(0.011)(0.016)
    [0.825][0.292][0.709]
     5 quarters ago0.0050.0080.004
    (0.013)(0.016)(0.019)
    [0.732][0.618][0.849]
     6 quarters ago0.0000.008−0.007
    (0.013)(0.014)(0.018)
    [0.994][0.596][0.699]
     7 quarters ago−0.0020.004−0.006
    (0.013)(0.015)(0.020)
    [0.914][0.825][0.790]
    Quarter–year FE✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓✓
    Observations329,566165,244164,322
    R20.0670.0610.063
    Dependent variable mean (control)0.6970.7330.661
    • Notes: The sample is composed of girls of the age specified in the column header interviewed in ENOE between 2008 and 2018. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the girl attended school at the moment of the survey. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each quarter relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in the girl’s state of residence, with the quarter before the reform being the omitted category. We only report five lead coefficients for ease of interpretation and seven lag coefficients because there are few states for which more than seven quarters have passed since the reform was enacted. The regression also includes state fixed effects, quarter–year fixed effects, states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married, age dummies, and town-size dummies. These estimates are weighted using the sampling weights provided in ENOE. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • * p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • *** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 5

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Early Motherhood of 16- and 17-Year-Old Girls

    First Births per 1,000 Girls of Age
    16–171617
    Child marriage banned
     Months [−12,9]0.032−0.0370.101
    (0.085)(0.102)(0.099)
    [0.732][0.727][0.325]
     Months [−8,−5]0.0860.0510.120
    (0.079)(0.085)(0.091)
    [0.319][0.572][0.207]
     Months [0,3]0.035−0.0620.133*
    (0.064)(0.079)(0.071)
    [0.560][0.447][0.066]
     Months [4,7]0.1770.1320.223*
    (0.107)(0.120)(0.122)
    [0.127][0.300][0.083]
     Months [8,11]0.0090.0110.008
    (0.087)(0.115)(0.086)
    [0.910][0.941][0.925]
     Months [12,15]−0.008−0.0720.056
    (0.121)(0.149)(0.121)
    [0.948][0.671][0.667]
    Month–year FE✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓✓
    Observations3,9363,9363,936
    R20.6770.5780.600
    Dependent variable mean (control)5.5845.2035.967
    • Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states from January 2008 to March 2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. The dependent variable is the monthly number of (live) first births conceived by a girl from the age group specified in the column header, per 1,000 girls from the age group who reside in that state. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each four-month period relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the period before the reform being the omitted category. We only report lead coefficients for up to 12 months before the reform for ease of interpretation and lag coefficients for 15 months after the reform, as there are few states for which more than 15 months have passed since the reform was enacted. Controls include states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ** p < 0.05,

    • *** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 6

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Civil Status of 16- and 17-Year-Old Mothers

    MarriedUnionSingleMissing
    Child marriage banned
     Months [−12,9]0.004−0.0070.011*−0.008***
    (0.006)(0.008)(0.006)(0.002)
    [0.535][0.438][0.083][0.000]
     Months [−8,−5]0.000−0.0050.008−0.003**
    (0.004)(0.006)(0.005)(0.001)
    [0.954][0.416][0.101][0.046]
     Months [0,3]−0.013**0.0070.0030.003*
    (0.005)(0.007)(0.006)(0.002)
    [0.019][0.390][0.603][0.079]
     Months [4,7]−0.020**0.0110.0070.002
    (0.008)(0.015)(0.012)(0.003)
    [0.021][0.494][0.639][0.507]
     Months [8,11]−0.041***0.037*0.0010.003
    (0.013)(0.018)(0.013)(0.003)
    [0.000][0.068][0.942][0.388]
     Months [12,15]−0.052***0.071***−0.023*0.003
    (0.015)(0.017)(0.012)(0.004)
    [0.001][0.000][0.075][0.423]
     Months [16,19]−0.055***0.085***−0.033*0.002
    (0.018)(0.022)(0.015)(0.003)
    [0.002][0.000][0.058][0.512]
     Months [20,23]−0.054**0.086***−0.035*0.003
    (0.022)(0.026)(0.018)(0.003)
    [0.016][0.002][0.081][0.390]
    Month–year FE✓✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓✓✓
    Observations4,2244,2244,2244,224
    R20.8390.7490.7130.453
    Dependent variable mean (control)0.1730.5990.2110.017
    • Notes: The sample includes all Mexican states in 2008–2018, and the unit of observation is a month–state. The dependent variable is the share of 16–17-year-old mothers residing in a given state and who gave birth in a given month that had the civil status in the column header at the moment of delivery. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each four-month period relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in state s, with the period before the reform being the omitted category. We only report lead coefficients for up to 12 months before the reform for ease of interpretation and lag coefficients for 23 months after the reform, as there are few states for which more than 23 months have passed since the reform was enacted. Controls include states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 7

    Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of Banning Child Marriage on Prenatal Investment ofl6—17-Year-Old Mothers and Newborn Health

    Prenatal InvestmentsNewborn Health
    Prenatal CareFirst Visit ITPrenatal VisitsCesareanPrematureLow BirthweightApgar <7
    Child marriage banned
     Months [−12,9]−0.002−0.001−0.027−0.0020.0020.0000.001
    (0.002)(0.006)(0.031)(0.003)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.388][0.848][0.407][0.573][0.520][0.861][0.574]
     Months [−8,−5]−0.0010.001−0.015−0.0020.0020.0000.002**
    (0.001)(0.005)(0.023)(0.004)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.229][0.864][0.571][0.555][0.404][0.814][0.011]
     Months [0,3]0.0000.001−0.0030.007*−0.000−0.0010.000
    (0.001)(0.004)(0.023)(0.004)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.928][0.687][0.881][0.099][0.898][0.719][0.751]
     Months [4,7]0.0020.009**−0.005−0.004−0.002−0.0020.000
    (0.002)(0.004)(0.042)(0.005)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.296][0.048][0.907][0.418][0.284][0.327][0.837]
     Months [8,11]0.0020.005−0.0280.012**0.0020.003−0.000
    (0.002)(0.005)(0.053)(0.005)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.275][0.377][0.630][0.039][0.330][0.247][0.877]
     Months [12,15]0.0010.008−0.0180.0090.0010.001−0.001
    (0.002)(0.006)(0.068)(0.008)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)
    [0.722][0.176][0.809][0.292][0.534][0.835][0.663]
    Month–year FE✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
    State FE✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
    Controls✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
    Observations1,445,9521,454,6691,413,4571,454,0641,456,2811,376,6821,443,456
    R20.0080.0120.0220.0110.0010.0030.003
    Dependent variable mean (control)0.9720.6796.6830.3680.0550.0580.012
    • Notes: The sample includes all women who had their first child between January 2008 and March of 2018 and were 16 to 17 years old at the moment of conception. In Columns 1, 2, and 4, the dependent variables are dummies for whether the mother had any prenatal care, had her first prenatal visit in the first trimester, and had a C-section, respectively. The dependent variable in column 3 is the number of prenatal visits. The dependent variables in Columns 5–7 are dummy variables for whether the child was born with the condition specified in the column header. The regressors of interest are dummy variables for each four-month period relative to the period in which child marriage was banned for this age group in the state of residence of the mother, with the period before the reform being the omitted category. We only report lead coefficients for up to 12 months before the reform for ease of interpretation and lag coefficients for 15 months after the reform, as there are few states for which more than 15 months have passed since the reform was enacted. Controls include states’ unemployment rate, poverty rate, labor force participation of females ages 20 and older, average income of employed individuals, population (in ln), dummy variables for whether the state governor belongs to PRI, PAN, or PRD, and a dummy for whether girls of this age required the authorization of a judge/mayor to get married. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses, and cluster-robust wild-bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Significance:

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • *** p < 0.01.

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    • 1219-10621R2_supp.pdf
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Journal of Human Resources: 58 (1)
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 58, Issue 1
1 Jan 2023
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Will You Marry Me, Later?
Cristina Bellés-Obrero, María Lombardi
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2023, 58 (1) 221-259; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.58.3.1219-10621R2

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Will You Marry Me, Later?
Cristina Bellés-Obrero, María Lombardi
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2023, 58 (1) 221-259; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.58.3.1219-10621R2
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    • ABSTRACT
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Child Marriage in Mexico
    • III. Conceptual Framework
    • IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
    • V. Estimation Strategy
    • VI. Results
    • VII. Implications
    • VIII. Validity and Robustness Checks
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Keywords

  • J12
  • J13
  • K36
  • I20
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