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Research ArticleArticles
Open Access

The Minimum Wage, EITC, and Criminal Recidivism

View ORCID ProfileAmanda Y. Agan and View ORCID ProfileMichael D. Makowsky
Journal of Human Resources, September 2023, 58 (5) 1712-1751; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.58.5.1220-11398R1
Amanda Y. Agan
Amanda Y. Agan is an assistant professor of economics at Rutgers University–New Brunswick ().
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  • For correspondence: [email protected]
Michael D. Makowsky
Michael D. Makowsky is an associate professor of Economics in the John E. Walker Department of Economics at Clemson University.
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Article Figures & Data

Figures

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  • Figure 1
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    Figure 1

    One-Year Recidivism Rates for California versus Other States

  • Figure 2
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    Figure 2

    Number of States Changing Minimum Wage by Year

    Notes: A 2007 amendment enacted federal minimum changes in 2007, 2008, and 2009 ($5.85 effective July 24, 2007; $6.55 effective July 24, 2008; and $7.25 effective July 24, 2009). If a state already had a minimum wage at or above these federal increases, then it would not register as having a minimum wage change; hence, the number changed in those years is not 51.

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    Figure 3

    States with Minimum Wages Above Federal and EITC Top-Ups in January 2000 and January 2014

    Notes: This map reports state minimum wage and EITC programs at the beginning and end of our sample. States not included in our sample are reported as “out of sample.”

  • Figure 4
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    Figure 4

    Correlation between Minimum Wage and Recidivism

    Notes: To construct the binned scatter plots we plot the probability of recidivism within three years of release (y-axis) over the minimum wage (x-axis). Observations are demeaned for state and year effects. The observed state–year residual mean rates of recidivism are divided into 50 bins of equal numbers of observations and plotted over the mean minimum wage within each bin. Fifty bins were chosen for symmetry with the subsequent plot of EITC state top-ups (Figure 5). The figure is qualitatively identical plotted with 20 bins. The line shows the best linear fit.

  • Figure 5
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    Figure 5

    Correlation between State EITC Top-Ups and Recidivism

    Notes: To construct the binned scatter plots, we plot the probability of recidivism within three years of release (y-axis) over the EITC top-up percent (x-axis). Observations are demeaned for state and year effects The observed state–year residual rates of recidivism are divided into 50 bins of equal numbers of observations and plotted over the mean EITC top-up within each bin. Fifty bins were chosen to so that the states without a state top-up (that is, zeros) were not overrepresented as bins. The figure is qualitatively identical plotted with twenty bins. The line shows the best linear fit.

Tables

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    Table 1

    Summary Statistics: Characteristics of Sample

    AllRecidivate 1 YearRecidivate 3 Years
    Male      0.882      0.903      0.905
    White (not Hispanic)      0.427      0.415      0.402
    Black (not Hispanic)      0.425      0.438      0.464
    Hispanic      0.120      0.109      0.103
    Less than HS degree      0.388      0.401      0.421
    HS degree      0.315      0.325      0.312
    College degree      0.007      0.005      0.005
    Prior felony incarceration      0.290      0.334      0.330
    Age at release    35.063    33.642    33.507
    Time served (days)  655.543  485.335  540.696
    Prior offense violent      0.216      0.192      0.189
    Prior offense property      0.289      0.341      0.334
    Prior offense drug      0.294      0.273      0.293
    Min. wage      6.405      6.313      6.093
    State EITC      0.357      0.393      0.374
    State EITC percent      5.229      5.962      5.532
    Observations5,786,062999,3211,645,055
    • Notes: “Recidivate 1 Year” indicates those released prisoners who returned to prison within one year of their release (analogous for “Recidivate 3 Year”). Violent, Property, Drug are indicators for the offense for which the offender initially went to prison. The final three rows represent the average value of those policy variables for the state and month in which the offender was released. State EITC is a dummy for whether the state had its own EITC in a given year; thus, that row represents a proportion. “State EITC percent” is the average percent of the federal EITC that the top-up represents.

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    Table 2

    Summary Statistics: Recidivism Rates

    Recidivate 1 Year
    (1)
    Recidivate 3 Years
    (2)
    Overall0.1730.346
    Men0.1770.355
    Women0.1420.284
    Black (not Hispanic)0.1780.370
    White (not Hispanic)0.1680.331
    Hispanic0.1560.303
    Less than HS0.1790.363
    HS0.1780.349
    More than HS0.1480.299
    Returning offense violent0.0320.062
    Returning offense property0.0570.113
    Returning offense drug0.0470.103
    Observations5,786,0624,749,284
    • Notes: “Recidivate 1 Year” indicates those released prisoners who returned to prison within one year of their release (analogous for “Recidivate 3 Year”). Column 2 has fewer observations to allow everyone to have three years of post-release data, whereas Column 1 only requires one year of post-release data.

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    Table 3

    Summary Statistics on Minimum Wages and EITCs by State–Year–Month, 2000–2014

    MeanSDMin.Max.
    Minimum wage6.43  1.105.15  9.50
    Number of minimum wage changes4.73  2.542.0013.00
    Size of minimum wage change0.51  0.330.04  1.80
    Size of minimum wage change (%)0.08  0.060.01  0.35
    Has state EITC0.39  0.490.00  1.00
    State EITC percent6.3910.220.0040.00
    • Notes: Each observation is a state–year–month, so there are 9,180 observations (51 states including DC × 15 years × 12 months). A change in the state minimum wage could come from a state-level law or a federal minimum wage change. Minimum wages are measured in real 2011 dollars. Note: 17 states had no changes other than the federal minimum wage increases. State EITC percent is the percent of the federal EITC that the state EITC represents.

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    Table 4

    Minimum Wage and Recidivism Rates

    1 Year3 Year
    Linear
    (1)
    Log
    (2)
    Linear
    (3)
    Log
    (4)
    Min. wage−0.0091**
    (0.0040)
    −0.0517**
    (0.0225)
    −0.0149***
    (0.0044)
    −0.0869***
    (0.0269)
    Wild bootstrap p0.0780.0480.0090.013
    Mean recid. rate0.1730.346
    Observations5,786,0625,786,0624,749,2844,749,284
    • Notes: The dependent variable is return to prison in the same state within one or three years of release (indicated in the column heading). Minimum wage is measured in nominal dollars in the state and month the offender was released. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, as well as the individual and time-varying state-level controls outlined in Section III. State EITC policy is included as a dummy variable, but its coefficient is not shown. See Table 6 for those result stratified by gender. Mean recidivism rates are the mean of the dependent variable for the respective column. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (43 clusters). p-values from 1,000 wild-cluster bootstrap iterations are shown for the main minimum wage coefficient as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) in cases with a small number of clusters, typically ≤30 (our analysis is near but not belowthis threshold).

    • * p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01 (based on cluster-robust standard errors).

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    Table 5

    Trend Analysis: One- and Three- Year Recidivism Rates

    Main
    (1)
    Future Minimum Wage
    (2)
    State-Specific Time Trend PolynomialsDivision × Year FE
    (6)
    Binding Changes
    (7)
    Linear
    (3)
    2nd
    (4)
    3rd
    (5)
    Panel A: 1 Year Recidivism
    Min. wage−0.0091**
    (0.0040)
    −0.0109**
    (0.0046)
    −0.0042
    (0.0039)
    −0.0067**
    (0.0029)
    −0.0065**
    (0.0026)
    −0.0082*
    (0.0047)
    −0.0097**
    (0.0048)
    Future minimum wage change−0.0041
    (0.0028)
    Bound minimum wage0.0006
    (0.0339)
    Min. wage × bound−0.0006
    (0.0053)
    Wild bootstrap p0.0590.0610.3350.0530.0100.1410.071
    Observations5,786,0625,786,0625,786,0625,786,0625,786,0625,786,0625,786,062
    Panel B: Three-Year Recidivism
    Min. wage−0.0149***
    (0.0044)
    −0.0049
    (0.0039)
    −0.0044
    (0.0039)
    −0.0069**
    (0.0033)
    −0.0149***
    (0.0054)
    −0.0162***
    (0.0042)
    Future minimum wage change
    Bound minimum wage
    −0.0247
    (0.0328)
    Min. wage × bound0.0038
    (0.0049)
    Wild bootstrap p0.0100.2310.2660.0670.0280.001
    Observations4,749,2844,749,2844,749,2844,749,2844,749,2844,749,284
    • Notes: The dependent variable is return to prison in the same state within one or three years of release as indicated by the panel title. Minimum wage is measured in nominal dollars and is measured in the state and month the offender was released. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, as well as the individual and time-varying state-level controls outlined in Section III. State EITC policy is included as a dummy variable, but its coefficient is not shown. For baseline means, see Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (43 clusters). p-values from 1,000 wild-cluster bootstrap iterations are shown for the main minimum wage coefficient, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) in cases with a small number of clusters, typically ≤30 (our analysis is near but not below this threshold). Results are based off of Table 4 Columns 1 and 3, which are repeated in Column 1 “Main.” Additions to these regressions are indicated in the column headers. Future minimum wage change is the maximum minimum wage within the window 13–24 months after release minus the minimum wage 12 months after release; it is meant to measure a future minimum wage change that does not occur within one year of release—hence it is only included in the one-year recidivism results. Bound minimum wage is an indicator for a state–year that was bound by one of the three federal changes in 2007, 2008, or 2009—that is, had a state minimum wage below the new federal level at the beginning of the year.

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01 (based on cluster-robust standard errors).

    • View popup
    Table 6

    State EITC and Minimum Wage Effects on Recidivism Rates by Gender

    FemaleMale
    1 Year
    (1)
    3 Year
    (2)
    1 Year
    (3)
    3 Year
    (4)
    Panel A: Any State EITC
    State EITC0.0003
    (0.0055)
    −0.0203***
    (0.0064)
    0.0070
    (0.0055)
    −0.0017
    (0.0071)
    Min. wage−0.0105*
    (0.0057)
    −0.0161**
    (0.0065)
    −0.0091**
    (0.0039)
    −0.0149***
    (0.0044)
    Min. wage coeff. wild bootstrap p0.1310.0470.0620.011
    EITC coeff. wild bootstrap pa0.9570.0540.2820.842
    Panel B: State EITC Percent
    State EITC percent−0.0006
    (0.0010)
    −0.0017
    (0.0011)
    0.0008
    (0.0007)
    −0.0002
    (0.0008)
    Min. wage−0.0105*
    (0.0056)
    −0.0160**
    (0.0064)
    −0.0091**
    (0.0039)
    −0.0149***
    (0.0044)
    Min. wage coeff. wild bootstrap p0.1170.0470.0610.004
    EITC coeff. wild bootstrap pa0.6500.2610.3500.843
    Mean recid. rate0.1420.2840.1770.355
    Observations680,826551,2115,105,2364,198,073
    • Notes: The dependent variable is return to prison in the same state within one or three years of release (indicated in the column heading). Minimum wage is measured in nominal dollars. State EITC is an indicator for the existence of a state top-up. State EITC percent is the percent of the federal EITC available to those in that state measured in percentage points. All are measured in the state and month the offender was released. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, as well as the individual and time-varying state-level controls outlined in Section III. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (43 clusters). p-values from 1,000 wild-cluster bootstrap iterations are shown for the main minimum wage coefficient and the EITC coefficients, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is small.

    • ↵* p <0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

    • ↵a To address the smaller number of treated clusters for EITC estimates, the EITC wild boostrap errors are estimated at the state–year subcluster (MacKinnon and Webb 2018; Roodman et al. 2019).

    • View popup
    Table 7

    Outcome Differentials by Returning Crime, Race and Ethnicity, and Education

    1 Year3 Year
    Violent
    (1)
    Property
    (2)
    Drug
    (3)
    Other
    (4)
    Violent
    (5)
    Property
    (6)
    Drug
    (7)
    Other
    (8)
    Min. wage−0.0004
    (0.0011)
    −0.0049***
    (0.0012)
    −0.0032**
    (0.0015)
    −0.0007
    (0.0013)
    −0.0009
    (0.0015)
    −0.0064***
    (0.0017)
    −0.0057***
    (0.0018)
    −0.0019
    (0.0015)
    Wild bootstrap p0.7840.0020.0750.6160.6130.0030.0270.227
    Mean recid. rate0.0320.0570.0470.0360.0620.1130.1030.069
    Observations5,786,0625,786,0625,786,0625,786,0624,749,2844,749,2844,749,2844,749,284
    Education
    <HS
    (9)
    HS
    (10)
    >HS
    (11)
    <HS
    (12)
    HS
    (13)
    >HS
    (14)
    Min. wage−0.0150***
    (0.0049)
    −0.0094*
    (0.0054)
    −0.0104
    (0.0079)
    −0.0210***
    (0.0054)
    −0.0156**
    (0.0061)
    −0.0141
    (0.0088)
    Observations2,245,9041,824,652317,6091,907,9471,472,633258,196
    Wild bootstrap p0.0320.1840.3170.0050.0480.228
    Mean recid. rate0.1790.1780.1480.3630.3490.299
    Race/Ethnicity
    Black
    (15)
    White
    (16)
    Hispanic
    (17)
    Black
    (18)
    White
    (19)
    Hispanic
    (20)
    Min. wage−0.0114**
    (0.0051)
    −0.0080*
    (0.0041)
    −0.0050
    (0.0046)
    −0.0151**
    (0.0060)
    −0.0122**
    (0.0048)
    −0.0117**
    (0.0055)
    Observations2,457,7942,471,327696,3382,062,4321,998,305561,803
    Wild bootstrap p0.0590.0970.4410.0340.0330.200
    Mean recid. rate0.1780.1680.1560.3700.3310.303
    • Notes: In Columns 1–8 the dependent variable is return to prison for a certain crime type within one or three years of release (as indicated by column headers). Columns 9–20 are one- and three-year rates of returning to prison within subsamples based on either education level or race/ethnicity. >HS means any college, not necessarily a college degree. Minimum wage is measured in nominal dollars in the state and month the offender was released. Mean recidivism rates are the mean of the dependent variable for the respective column. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, as well as the individual and time-varying state-level controls outlined in Section III. State EITC policy is included as a dummy variable but its coefficient is not shown. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (43 clusters). p-values from 1,000 wild-cluster bootstrap iterations are shown for the main minimum wage coefficient, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) in cases with a small number of clusters, typically ≤30 (our analysis is near but not below this threshold). Outcome heterogeneity by gender is examined in Table 6.

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01 (based on cluster-robust standard errors).

    • View popup
    Table 8

    State EITCs and Outcome Differentials for Female Offenders by Returning Crime, Race and Ethnicity, and Education

    1 Year3 Year
    Violent
    (1)
    Property
    (2)
    Drug
    (3)
    Other
    (4)
    Violent
    (5)
    Property
    (6)
    Drug
    (7)
    Other
    (8)
    State EITC0.0008
    (0.0013)
    −0.0010
    (0.0044)
    0.0034*
    (0.0019)
    −0.0029*
    (0.0015)
    −0.0007
    (0.0015)
    −0.0104*
    (0.0058)
    −0.0019
    (0.0039)
    −0.0073***
    (0.0019)
    Wild bootstrap pa0.5900.8250.1290.1800.7470.1880.7290.048
    Mean recid. rate0.0130.0510.0470.0310.0250.1050.0980.055
    Observations680,826680,826680,826680,826551,211551,211551,211551,211
    Education
    <HS
    (9)
    HS
    (10)
    >HS
    (11)
    <HS
    (12)
    HS
    (13)
    >HS
    (14)
    State EITC0.0002
    (0.0072)
    −0.0025
    (0.0078)
    −0.0277**
    (0.0107)
    −0.0237**
    (0.0109)
    −0.0228**
    (0.0105)
    −0.0355***
    (0.0120)
    Wild bootstrap pa0.9870.7940.0550.1970.1510.045
    Mean recid. rate0.1510.1370.1150.3030.2750.241
    Observations247,801211,70148,929211,210168,84038,925
    Race/Ethnicity
    Black
    (15)
    White
    (16)
    Hispanic
    (17)
    Black
    (18)
    White
    (19)
    Hispanic
    (20)
    State EITC0.0014
    (0.0071)
    −0.0002
    (0.0076)
    0.0137
    (0.0227)
    −0.0101
    (0.0079)
    −0.0268***
    (0.0095)
    −0.0147
    (0.0290)
    Wild bootstrap pa0.8760.9770.6790.3960.0920.712
    Mean recid. rate0.1350.1410.1490.2840.2780.289
    Observations219,083380,13053,340187,962299,33341,998
    • Notes: Only female offenders are included in this table. In Columns 1–8 the dependent variable is return to prison for a certain crime type within one or three years of release (as indicated by column headers). Remaining columns the dependent variable is return to prison within one or three years of release (as indicated in column headers). Columns 9–20 are subsample results based on either education level or race/ethnicity. >HS means any college, not necessarily a college degree. State EITC is an indicator for the existence of a state top-up and is measured in the state and month the offender was released. Mean recidivism rates are the mean of the dependent variable for the respective column. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses (43 clusters). p-values from 1,000 wild-cluster bootstrap iterations are shown as well, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is small.

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01 (based on cluster-robust standard errors).

    • ↵a To address the smaller number of treated clusters for EITC estimates, the EITC wild boostrap errors are estimated at the state–year subcluster (MacKinnon and Webb 2018; Roodman et al. 2019). Results for men can be found in Online Appendix Table G.4.

    • View popup
    Table 9

    Minimum Wage Effects on Employment for Different Subpopulations: CPS Data

    (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)
    Panel A: Teenagers 15–19, CPS 1990–2009
    ln(MW) coeff.−0.050**
    (0.021)
    −0.041
    (0.034)
    −0.039
    (0.031)
    −0.028
    (0.025)
    −0.019
    (0.037)
    −0.090***
    (0.027)
    −0.086***
    (0.026)
    Elasticity−0.121−0.100−0.094−0.068−0.045−0.218−0.209
    Observations447,719447,719447,719447,719447,719447,719447,719
    Panel B: Low-Skill Black Men 25–54, CPS 1990–2016
    ln(MW) coeff.0.106**
    (0.045)
    0.028
    (0.049)
    0.093**
    (0.039)
    0.053
    (0.050)
    0.115**
    (0.046)
    0.075*
    (0.043)
    0.050
    (0.042)
    Elasticity0.1560.0420.1360.0780.1690.1100.074
    Observations104,020104,020104,020104,020104,020104,020104,020
    Panel C: Low-Skill Black Women 25–54, CPS 1990–2016
    ln(MW) coeff.0.098**
    (0.046)
    0.034
    (0.032)
    0.025
    (0.048)
    −0.016
    (0.043)
    0.043
    (0.056)
    0.051
    (0.055)
    −0.003
    (0.065)
    Elasticity0.1640.0560.041−0.0270.0710.086−0.004
    Observations129,329129,329129,329129,329129,329129,329129,329
    Div. × Quarter FENYNYNNN
    Linear trendsNNYYNNN
    Quadratic trendsNNNNYNN
    Cubic trendsNNNNNYN
    Quartic trendsNNNNNNY
    • Notes: Data from the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups, population stratification, and years are indicated in the panel titles. Panel A focuses on teenagers (15–19 years old),the targeting population from Allegretto et al. (2011) and Neumark et al. (2014). Panels B and C focus on “low-skill” Black men and women, with low skill here indicating the absence of postsecondary education. Each cell is a different regression. Elasticities are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the mean employment rate for the relevant population. Controls included in all regressions: age, nonseasonally adjusted unemployment rate, marital status, education, race/ethnicity, gender, quarter FE, state FE, and additional trends or FE as noted (in Panel A all specifications also include proportion of population aged 15–19 as in Allegretto et al. 2011). Column 1 provides a baseline estimation. Columns 2–4 replicate the key specifications of Allegretto et al. (2011). Columns 5–7 include different polynomial time trends, replicating the key specifications from Neumark et al. (2014). Regressions are weighted using the person-level weight wtfinl. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses.

    • ↵* p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

    • View popup
    Table 10

    Minimum Wage Effects on Employment by Voting Eligibility: CPS Data

    (1)(2)(3)(4)
    Panel A: Teenagers 15–19, CPS November Supplement
    Ln(MW) coeff.−0.084***
    (0.028)
    −0.084**
    (0.039)
    −0.015
    (0.036)
    0.012
    (0.045)
    Elasticity−0.229−0.230−0.0400.032
    Observations101,105101,105101,105101,105
    Panel B: Ineligible to Vote
    Ln(MW) coeff.0.191+
    (0.125)
    0.154
    (0.162)
    0.184
    (0.143)
    0.158
    (0.184)
    Elasticity0.3630.2920.3500.301
    Observations5,9345,9345,9345,934
    Panel C: Not Ineligible to Vote
    Ln(MW) coeff.−0.008
    (0.011)
    0.003
    (0.013)
    −0.013
    (0.009)
    −0.003
    (0.014)
    Elasticity−0.0160.006−0.024−0.005
    Observations644,516644,516644,516644,516
    Div. × Year FENYNY
    Linear trendsNNYY
    • Notes: Data from the November Current Population Survey (1990–2016; voting eligibility only available from in even years [federal election years] for 2004–2016). Dependent variable is employed (not including self-employment). Each cell is a different regression. Regressions in Panel A are meant to mimic Allegretto et al. 2011, including the sample restriction to teenagers (15–19 years old). In Panel B, we focus on citizens of voting age who say they are ineligible to vote; this is our proxy for having a criminal record. In Panel C, we run the same regression on citizens of voting age who do not say they are ineligible vote. Controls included but not shown are: gender, race, age, education, marital status, state unemployment rate, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and time trends or division x year effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses.

    • ↵+ p < 0.15,

    • * p < 0.10,

    • ↵** p < 0.05,

    • ↵*** p < 0.01.

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  • Free alternate access to The Journal of Human Resources supplementary materials is available at https://uwpress.wisc.edu/journals/journals/jhr-supplementary.html

    • 1220-11398R1_supp.pdf
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Journal of Human Resources: 58 (5)
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 58, Issue 5
1 Sep 2023
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The Minimum Wage, EITC, and Criminal Recidivism
Amanda Y. Agan, Michael D. Makowsky
Journal of Human Resources Sep 2023, 58 (5) 1712-1751; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.58.5.1220-11398R1

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The Minimum Wage, EITC, and Criminal Recidivism
Amanda Y. Agan, Michael D. Makowsky
Journal of Human Resources Sep 2023, 58 (5) 1712-1751; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.58.5.1220-11398R1
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