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Research ArticleArticles

Victimization and Skill Accumulation

The Case of School Bullying

Miguel Sarzosa
Journal of Human Resources, January 2024, 59 (1) 242-279; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0819-10371R2
Miguel Sarzosa
Miguel Sarzosa is an assistant professor at the Economics Department in Purdue University.
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Abstract

Recent literature has shown that skills are not only essential for the development of successful adults, but also that they are malleable and prone to be affected by many experiences, especially during childhood. This work examines how bullying depletes skills in schoolchildren. I formulate a dynamic model of skill accumulation with endogenous victimization based on the identification of unobserved heterogeneity. I allow victimization to depend on each student’s traits and those of their classmates. Using a unique longitudinal data set of middle school students, I find that victimization depletes current skill levels by 40 percent of a standard deviation for the average child. This skill depletion causes the individual to become 34 percent more likely to experience bullying again. Therefore, bullying triggers a self-reinforcing mechanism that opens an ever-growing skill gap. Finally, I find evidence that supports the allocation of students in more skill-homogeneous classrooms as a tool to reduce victimization.

JEL Classification:
  • I12
  • I14
  • I25
  • I31

I. Introduction

According to psychologists, a bullying victim is a person who is repeatedly and intentionally exposed to injury or discomfort by others in an environment where an imbalance of power exists (Olweus 1997).1 Sociologists suggest that bullying thrives in contexts where individuals need to show peer group status (Faris and Felmlee 2011). Not surprisingly, schools are the perfect setting for bullying. The combination of peer pressure, multidimensional heterogeneity of students, and juvenile lack of self-control makes schools a fertile ground for bullying. In 2013, 22 percent of U.S. students ages 12–18 reported being victimized in school (National Center for Education Statistics 2015).

Bullying is very costly. Eleven percent of urban American children miss school every day because of fear of being victimized (Kann et al. 2014). One of every ten students drops out or changes school because of it (Baron 2016). Homicide perpetrators are twice as likely as homicide victims to have been bullied previously by their peers (Gunnison, Bernat, and Goodstein 2016). Victims are between two and nine times more likely to consider suicide than nonvictims (Kim and Leventhal 2008; Kim et al. 2009). Surprisingly, economic literature has remained mostly silent on the topic. We know very little about its intermediate costs and long-term consequences. I contribute to bridging this gap by exploring the two-way relation between bullying and cognitive and noncognitive skills accumulation2—namely, how school bullying hampers the development of successful adults by impeding skill accumulation and the extent to which cognitive and noncognitive skills are themselves determinants of in-school victimization.3 To analyze this two-way relation, I extend the theoretical contributions of Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) to include peer-influenced events—like bullying—in the skills accumulation process. I allow future skills to depend on current skills, current investment choices, and victimization. I allow the likelihood of the bullying event to depend on own and peer observable and unobservable characteristics. Thus, I treat bullying as an event that may deplete the existing stock of skills, changing negatively the skill accumulation path for the people involved.

The model incorporates several desirable features. First, it acknowledges that social interactions like bullying are endogenous. Hence, the “treatment” is not randomly allocated across students. The way own characteristics relate to those of peers is critical in building up the social arena that determines victimization. Second, it recognizes that cognitive and noncognitive skill measures observed by the researcher are only approximations or functions of the true latent skills (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman 2003; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006). Third, it does not assume that those true latent skills follow a normal distribution, thus guaranteeing the flexibility required to recreate appropriately the unobserved distributions in the estimation. Finally, the model allows me to simulate counterfactuals for each skill level, which I use to calculate the divergence in skill accumulation paths caused by bullying.

This paper contributes to the economic literature in several ways. First, it extends the literature on dynamic skill accumulation by introducing peer-influenced events as essential drivers of the process. In particular, it considers the role endogenous peer victimization has on skill formation. Second, it analyzes the consequences of bullying in school in terms of skill depletion. Third, it extends my previous work on school bullying (Sarzosa and Urzua 2021), where I found sizable consequences borne during adulthood, by providing additional insight into the channels through which high school bullying affects adult outcomes. Fourth, it allows the quantification of the long-run cost of bullying. That is, I can go beyond short- and medium-term outcomes, like school absenteeism or young adult health, and estimate skill endowments losses for life. In addition, this will open an auspicious research agenda on skill accumulation and negative social interactions.

Using detailed longitudinal data on a cohort of South Korean students, I find that kids with low initial stocks of skills and those who have uncommon traits among their peers are significantly more likely to be bullied. I also find that victimization depletes current skill levels and makes individuals more prone to experiencing bullying again in the future, creating a self-reinforcing mechanism that generates an enormous burden they will carry during adulthood.

In the following, after reviewing the scarce economic literature on the subject in Section II, I present the basic framework for the analysis of skill dynamics in Section III. Section IV defines the empirical strategy I use. Section V describes the data I use for the analysis and how I construct the cognitive and noncognitive skill measures. Section VI presents results. Section VII focuses on how, in light of my results, some policies regarding students allocation to school can reduce school bullying. Finally, Section VIII concludes.

II. Related Literature

Although economic literature on the consequences disruptive classmates have on their peers has grown in recent years (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010, 2012; Carrell, Hoekstra, and Kuka 2018), economic research on bullying is scarce.4 Two main reasons explain this sparseness: (i) a lack of adequate data and (ii) the nonrandomness of the selection into bullying. Regarding the former, there is little longitudinal data that inquire about bullying, so researchers can use very few sources that observe individuals before and after the event. Regarding the latter, bullying’s nonrandomness confounds the consequences of bullying with the intrinsic characteristics that made the person a victim in the first place. The scarce existing economic literature has focused on quantifying of the effects bullying has on short- and medium-term outcomes. Brown and Taylor (2008) find that being bullied and being a bully are correlated with lower educational attainment in the UK. Eriksen, Nielsen, and Simonsen (2014) find that being bullied decreases ninth grade marks among Danish students. They find causal estimates by instrumenting victimization with the proportion of classroom peers whose parents have a criminal conviction. Sarzosa and Urzua (2021) embed a similar empirical strategy (that is, instrumenting victimization with the proportion of classroom peers that come from violent families and the proportion who claim to be bullies) in a framework of unobserved heterogeneity in terms of cognitive and noncognitive skills. They find that bullying increases the probability of smoking and the likelihood of feeling sick, depressed, stressed, and unsatisfied with life during adulthood. It also reduces college enrollment and increases the dislike of school. Interestingly, they find that the detrimental effects of bullying are greater for people with low levels of noncognitive skills.

I contribute to the literature of bullying by building on Sarzosa and Urzua (2021) and providing a possible explanation for the impacts they observe. While Sarzosa and Urzua (2021) estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of middle school bullying on young adult outcomes, in the present study, I elucidate one mechanism behind the creation of these gaps, showing bullying as the triggering event that determines a divergence in skill accumulation paths. In the present paper, I show that the gaps between victims and nonvictims open up early in life by embarking victims in skill accumulation paths lower than those they would have been on in the absence of victimization. In consequence, the identification strategies in the two papers differ significantly. While Sarzosa and Urzua (2021) estimates a static Roy model with unobserved heterogeneity, here I estimate a model of skill formation. Although both papers use the allocation of students to classrooms as an exogenous variation for identification, in the present study, I use it as an exogenous shifter of how uncommon students’ traits are in the pool of traits available in the classroom.

This work also relates to recent contributions in skill development that have established that skills are dynamic and malleable (Cunha et al. 2006; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010). They depend on their past levels. They can be hindered, and they can be fostered. We know that skills beget skills, and, therefore, initial skill endowments and early accumulation are critical for the lifetime stock of skills (Cunha et al. 2006). Skills beget skills through the natural process of getting the stock available at time t to t + 1 and through investment. That is, skilled kids receive more skill investment and have higher returns to those investments than less-skilled kids (Skinner and Belmont 1993; Aizer and Cunha 2012; Espinoza, Sarzosa, and Urzua 2014).5 This self-reinforcing mechanism increases skill inequality as children age—those who start their childhood with high initial levels of skills accumulate skills three times faster than those who start their development with meager stocks of skills (Agostinelli and Wiswall 2016a). These dynamics give foundation to the call for early childhood development and preschool interventions (Knudsen et al. 2006; Doyle et al. 2009).

The claim that skills are malleable is backed up by a series of papers that show that skill-developing interventions modified the stock of skills of the treated population. For instance, the people treated by Perry Preschool Program have higher noncognitive skills—although similar levels of cognitive skills—than the controls (Heckman et al. 2010). The Socio-Emotional Learning programs have been widely reviewed as successful interventions that develop noncognitive skills such as goal setting, conflict resolution, and decision-making (Payton et al. 2008). Skill-developing interventions can compensate for low initial levels of both cognitive and noncognitive skills (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010). Furthermore, extensive literature finds that family background influences skill accumulation. Children whose parents are more engaged in their upbringing are likely to have higher skill levels.6 However, evidence shows that there are windows of opportunity outside of which skill malleability is lost (Knudsen et al. 2006) and that such windows close earlier for cognitive than for noncognitive skills (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2006).

Besides the dynamism and malleability features of skills, recent literature has found that they strongly depend on the contexts in which the child grows.7 For instance, skill endowments depend on the level of stress a person was exposed to during childhood (McEwen and Seeman 2006) and the quality of school inputs, such as class size and teacher characteristics (Fredriksson, Ockert, and Oosterbeek 2013; Jackson 2013). One such context is the type of social interactions the child encounters in school. This paper includes interactions with peers as critical inputs in the development of own skills.

III. Skill Formation and Bullying

My framework needs to incorporate five facts that emanate from the skill formation literature: (i) skills beget skills, (ii) skill development can be affected by investment choices, (iii) past skills levels can affect next period skills indirectly by inducing skill investment, (iv) bullying (framed as a negative investment) can hamper skill development, and (v) bullying victimization depends also on the stock of cognitive and noncognitive skills of each person and those of their peers. Therefore, I propose to augment the dynamic structure in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) to incorporate these five facts explicitly. Thus, I adopt the timeline proposed in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), where student i who belongs to classroom c ∈ C starts the process with an initial stock of skills of type S ∈ {A, B}, θS,i∈c,τ, with A denoting noncognitive skills and B denoting cognitive skills. Parents observe θA,i∈c,τ and θB,i∈c,τ, receive an idiosyncratic investment-related shock ɛS,i∈c,τ+1, and decide IS,i∈c,τ+1, the amount to invest between period τ and τ + 1 in each skill dimension. Analogously, θA,i∈c,τ and θB,i∈c,τ together with classroom characteristics determine the victimization that may occur between the skill measurements at τ and τ + 1, which I label Mi∈c,τ+1. Hence, in general, parental investment and victimization at a given moment in time t ∈ [τ, T] are simultaneous. Parents do not observe victimization at the time they decide their skill investment strategy. This responds to the ample evidence indicating that parents are not usually aware of their children’s victimization (deLara 2012; Waasdorp and Bradshaw 2015; Bjereld, Daneback, and Petzold 2017; Larranaga, Yubero, and Navarro 2018).8 Parental investment made between times t and t + 1 respond, however, indirectly to past victimization. That is, through the effect bullying that occurred between t − 1 and t has on the stock of skills at t. This relies on the results of psychological research that indicates that responsive and supporting parenting practices are related with lower levels of bullying (Flouri and Buchanan 2002). In particular, certain parental behaviors that hamper the development of locus of control on kids have been linked with in-school victimization (Ladd and Ladd 1998).

Skills at τ + 1 are, thus, the product of the initial stock of skills θA,i∈c,τ and θB,i∈c,τ, the investment decisions and the victimization that took place between τ and τ + 1 IS,i∈c,τ+1 and Mi∈c,τ+1 and the realization of a skill production shock ηi∈c,τ+1. See a diagram with the timeline of the model’s typical two-period cycle in Online Appendix Figure B.1.

A. The Production Function of Skills

The empirical characterization of the skill production functions faces at least two challenges. First, all the sequences of Embedded Image and Embedded Image for S ∈ {A, B} are not directly observable. They are latent and influence the values we observe in manifest variables, such as cognitive scores, noncognitive scales, and parental investment measures (Cunha and Heckman 2008). Using a set of these manifest variables in place of the latent variation will severely bias the results (Attanasio et al. 2020c). Thus, as I will explain in greater detail in Section IV.A and Online Appendix C, I follow (Cunha and Heckman 2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and arrange the numerous manifest variables available in the data in measurement systems linking the manifest variables to the latent constructs we care about. This latent factor framework takes the common variation in the measurement systems of manifest variables and disentangles the variation that comes from the unobserved factors from the one generated by random shocks and the one that comes from exogenous observable traits like gender or age. Its goal is to allow for the estimation of the distribution of the latent factors (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman 2003). Note that unlike recent papers like Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) or Attanasio et al. (2020c), which use the estimated distributions of the latent factors to approximate a value of Embedded Image and Embedded Image for every i, I keep the latent variables as such—a feature that will come in handy when estimating the potential outcomes model (that is, victimization status-specific skill production functions).

The empirical characterization’s second challenge is that I need to impose some functional form assumptions about the family of production functions I will estimate. The goal is to impose some parametric assumptions to make the model estimable while allowing for such flexibility that, based on the data, it allows for the recovery of a wide assortment of production functions. I consider the technology of production of skill S in period t + 1 for those with victimization condition Mt+1 to follow a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function whose inputs are the stock of skills they had at time t(θA,i∈c,t and θB,i∈c,t) and the skill investment choices done between the two periods (IS,i∈c,t+1). The choice of the CES as the production function of skills responds to two main reasons. First, it follows the existing literature; that way, I can rely on some identifying assumptions already outlined in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010). Second, the CES allows the inputs involved in the skill production function to have nonlinear and joint effects while allowing them to remain latent. I am interested in one particular product of such nonlinearities: the “static complementarity” (∂2θS,t+1/∂IS,t+1∂A,t and ∂2θS,t+1/∂IS,t+1∂B,t), a concept introduced by Cunha and Heckman (2008) to describe how the current stock of skills affects the productivity of skill investment. I will use the same concept to analyze the skill depleting power of the bullying event.

The CES specification could be overly restrictive if the elasticities of substitution between inputs vary widely. In that sense, a translog function would capture nonlinear effects and complementarities like the CES while allowing for different substitution parameters between inputs (Agostinelli and Wiswall 2016a; Attanasio et al. 2020a). However, given that the translog function relies on interactions between inputs, its estimation requires inputs to be treated as observable (that is, Embedded Image and Embedded Image), which would be at odds with estimating of the model of potential outcomes I use to measure the treatment effects of victimization.9

B. “Selection into Bullying”

“Selection into bullying” is nonrandom; it depends on the victim’s and their classmates’ characteristics.10 The idea is that individual i with skills set (θA,i,t, θB,i,t) and observable traits Xit might be bullied in classroom c but not in classroom cʹ. This difference depends on the distributions of skills and traits that the other students bring to each classroom. Therefore, I model the way classmates’ traits affect student i’s probability of being bullied in a given classroom by introducing a measure of how rare within that classroom the potential victim’s traits are. I measure uncommonness by counting the number of classmates that lie inside an epsilon-ball in the skills and income space that is defined around those qualities for every kid. The intuition is that if your characteristics set you apart, meaning there are no kids similar to you (that is, low count in your epsilon-ball), you may have higher chances of being bullied. So, ∇ψ,i∈c(d) is the number of classmates of i in classroom c that lie in an epsilon-ball with radius d in the space of characteristics ψ. Zc is a vector containing school or school district characteristics, like teacher quality, overall faculty tolerance to bullying, or prevalence of domestic violence in the community, that influence the overall likelihood of bullying victimization (Dake, Price, and Telljohann 2003).

C. The Model of Skill Formation with School Bullying

The model of skill formation that allows for endogenous peer-influenced events can be described through the following equations: Embedded Image 1 Embedded Image 2

for S ∈ {A, B}, where Embedded Image for Mi ∈ {0,1}, 1[∙] is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if true. Embedded Image denote shocks that affect the accumulation of skill dimension S between t and t + 1. The CES parameters contain a superscript Mi ∈ {0,1} to indicate that the skills production functions for victimized students are different from those of nonvictimized ones. I assume that Embedded Image, and Embedded Image are independent and identically distributed (iid) shocks orthogonal to contemporaneous skills, to each other, across time and across victimization condition. The mutual independence of Embedded Image, and Embedded Image is the result of independence assumptions imposed on the measurement systems used to obtain the distributions of the latent variables Embedded Image, and Embedded Image. I will comment further on these assumptions in Section IV.B.1. Furthermore, I assume that Embedded Image.

Through the victimization Equation 2, I incorporate two stylized facts of bullying established by the psychological literature: (i) that there are personal characteristics of the student that influence the chances of being bullied (that is, behavioral issues) (Reijntjes et al. 2010) and (ii) that there are characteristics of the peer group that set the bullied student apart from their classmates (for example, lacks friends, is rejected by the peer group) (Hodges, Malone, and Perry 1997). The victimization equation responds to the fact that bullying needs a social arena in which the imbalances of power occur, allowing classmates to play different roles: victim, perpetrator, and bystanders.11 Therefore, the question arises: What separates bystanders from victims? Here is where the uncommonness feature becomes essential, as it operationalizes the imbalance of power bullying requires based on the fact that kids with uncommon characteristics are more easily regarded as weird and unlikeable, which fosters peer rejection (Hodges, Malone, and Perry 1997).12

Identification of Equation 2 within Model 1 relies on the assumption that the allocation of individual i to classroom c was exogenous, and therefore the assignment of i’s classmates is orthogonal to their own traits. As I describe in greater detail in Section V, I estimate the model using data from South Korean middle schools. The South Korean context is perfect for identifying Equation 2 thanks to a law that requires school districts to assign students randomly to middle schools and prohibits the grouping of students by ability and achievement levels (Kang 2007).

The way I introduce classmates’ characteristics into the victimization likelihood through ∇ψ,i∈c(d) is also econometrically advantageous, as it goes around the well-known problem of peer-effect identification. According to Angrist (2014), randomness in peer allocation is not sufficient to identify peer effects. He claims that to prevent the unwanted existence of mechanical statistical forces that create spurious correlations, the econometrician needs some observations within the group not to be affected or “treated” by the same peer effect. In my approach, the uncommonness measure allows every observation to have a different “treatment” to the point that, although everyone is affected by what happens inside their particular epsilon-ball, the relative position of those classmates that do not fall within it is irrelevant.

IV. Empirical Strategy

A. Measurement System and Unobserved Heterogeneity

The key feature of the empirical strategy is how it deals with the fact that underlying cognitive and noncognitive skills and investment preferences are latent rather than observable.13 They are not well-defined entities with measurement scales and instruments like height and weight are. Instead, these latent constructs need to be inferred from scores, called manifest variables, that can be directly observed and measured (Bartholomew, Knott, and Moustaki 2011). I start from the assumption of a linear relation between the manifest and the latent variables. It can be thought of as a production function of manifest measures, whose inputs include individual observable characteristics and the latent endowments. The empirical strategy incorporates the fact that the observed manifest values respond not only to the latent variables of interest (Θ, I), but also to observable traits (X) and random shocks (eT, νS).

Suppose we follow individuals for two time periods: t and t + 1. Then, the measurement system—omitting the student and classroom subscripts to simplify notation—is the following: Embedded Image 3 Embedded Image 4 Embedded Image 5 Embedded Image 6

where Tτ is a L × 1 vector that contains the scores of cognitive tests and noncognitive measurements at time τ ∈ {t, t + 1}, ⊥S,t+1 is a Embedded Image vector that contains each of the investment measures made in skill S ∈ {A, B} at time t + 1. The latent variables of interest are skills Θτ = [θA,τ, θB,τ] and investments IA,t+1 and IB,t+1. Θτ follows the bivariate distribution Embedded Image , and IA,t+1 and IB,t+1 follow distributions Embedded Image and Embedded Image , respectively. Xτ,T are matrixes with all observable controls affecting the scores at time τ ∈ {t,t + 1}, and Xt+1,⊥ is a matrix containing all observable controls affecting manifest investment measures at time t + 1. Embedded Image are loadings matrixes of the unobserved skills, while Embedded Image and Embedded Image are the same for the unobserved investment factors. I assume that after controlling for observable and unobservable traits, error terms eτT and Embedded Image are orthogonal to each other, across time and across equations. That is, I assume that (Θτ, Xτ,T) ⊥ eτT and that all the elements of the L × 1 vector eτT follow a multivariate normal distribution 𝒩(0, ΣL), where ΣL is a L × L matrix with zeroes in its off-diagonal elements. Likewise, I assume Embedded Image and Embedded Image , and that Embedded Image where Embedded Image is a square matrix with zeroes in its off-diagonal elements. Furthermore, Embedded Image , and Embedded Image .

Online Appendix C presents the arguments for the identification of the model, including coefficients, factor loadings, and factor distributions. I do not impose normality to the distributions of the factors Embedded Image or Embedded Image. Instead, I use the mixture of normals in order to achieve the flexibility required to mimic the true underlying distributions of the latent endowments (Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix 2017). The mixture of normals enables the model to replicate a wide range of distributions and allows numerical integration using the Gauss–Hermite quadrature (Judd 1998). Numerical integration based on the estimated distribution of the factors is required throughout the whole estimation procedure due to the unobservable nature of the factors. Then, using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, I obtain Embedded Image and Embedded Image.

B. Estimation

1. Identification and estimation steps

As shown in Online Appendix C, we can use Equation 3 to identify Embedded Image, and similarly, Equations 5 and 6 to identify Embedded Image and Embedded Image. Also, we can use Equation 4 to identify Embedded Image and consistently estimate Embedded Image and Embedded Image. In consequence, I am able to construct the vector Embedded Image 7

Taking advantage of the orthogonality and mutually independence between Embedded Image, Embedded Image, and ηt and of the nonlinearity of the skills production functions, I substitute them from Equation 1 into the measurement system for Embedded Image. For the sake of brevity, let me call Embedded Image the production function of skill S at time t + 1 for those whose victimization condition is M ∈ {0, 1}. Then, I can write Equation 7 as Embedded Image 8

which together with the victimization Equation 9 (that is, the empirical version of Equation 2) Embedded Image 9

builds a Roy-like potential outcomes model that endogenizes the bullying “treatment” and allows me to estimate treatment effects of victimization on skill formation (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007). Formally: Embedded Image

Equation 9 collects the facts that victimization not only depends on the potential victim’s characteristics, but also on the social arena the student faces (that is, the traits that classmates bring to the group). As explained in Section III, I introduce this feature in the model by creating a measure of how uncommon the traits of a given student are among their classmates. To identify empirically such social process, I require that the allocation of students—and therefore their traits—to classrooms be as good as random. That way, the social arena each student faces is random, and therefore the differences in the probability of being victimized given one’s traits depends on the differences in the traits’ distributions across classrooms. In the same way and as additional exclusion restrictions for the identification of Equation 9, I follow Sarzosa and Urzua (2021) and introduce two additional traits of the social arena of the classroom: the proportion of peers that report being bullies in the class and the proportion of peers in the classroom that come from a violent family.14

The measurement system requires several considerations. First, note that Embedded Image is a compounded error term, with Embedded Image and Embedded Image, whose diagonal elements are of the form Embedded Image, and its off-diagonal elements are of the form Embedded Image. It is straightforward to see that Embedded Image is identified from the fact that Embedded Image and Embedded Imageare known from the first stage. Hence, I am effectively reducing the dimensionality of the computational task of estimating the model. It is now a four-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity problem: two dimensions of skills at t and the investment latent factor for each skill. Second, identification of this potential outcomes model and its associated treatment parameters requires that Embedded Image (a modified version of assumption (A-1c) in Heckman, Humphries, and Veramendi (2016). This assumption implies two underlying assumptions: Embedded Image and Embedded Image. The former is a mild assumption, as its violation would require a very unique kind of shock—one that jointly shifts the chances of victimization and scores recorded by the cognitive tests and noncognitive measures in t + 1, but does not affect the stock of skills at that moment in time. The latter assumption, which I alluded to in Section III.C, maintains independence of the shocks to the chances of victimization and the part of the variation in the latent variable θS,t+1 not explained by θA,t, θA,t, and IS,t+1. Therefore, shocks that simultaneously alter the “sorting into victimization” and period t + 1 skills without going through Embedded Image are considered threats to the identification of the model. To deal with this concern, I estimated a version of the model that includes numerous shocks that could have the potential of violating the identifying assumption (that is, death of parent, parent failed in business, parent lost job, parent was hospitalized) both in the victimization Equation 9 and in the potential outcome Equation 8 as an additional observable control. Table 8 of the Web Appendix shows that although the shocks are significant determinants of victimization, the parameters of the production function remain unaltered. The fact that the results are robust to the introduction of the shocks illustrates that their scope is too small to be meaningful.

2. Overall mean shifts and the identification of the CES function

As in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), my estimated factors’ distributions are centered at zero. In particular, E[θS,t] = E[θS,t+1] = 0 for S ∈ {A, B}. These normalizations are at odds with the fact that Embedded Image shifts with changes in ρ, as shown in Figure 1. It simulates 1,440 different combinations of γ1, γ2, and ρ to generate Embedded Image, where x, y, and z come from 5,000 random draws from independent normal distributions. Figure 1 evidences that estimating a model that fits Embedded Image = 0 greatly constrains the set of possible values that Embedded Image can take, and its combinations with the other parameters in the CES function. In other words, the normalizations limit the families of functions that can be estimated. This is consistent with the argument in Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016b), who point out that the normalizations bias the estimations towards finding a functional form consistent with a Cobb–Douglas. One way to fix this is to depart from the estimation procedure put forth by Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), as proposed by Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a). Another way is to use the fact that the relation between Embedded Image and the CES parameters is predictable, as evidenced by Figure 1. In fact, Online Appendix Table D.1 shows that a flexible cubic polynomial in the CES parameters (that is, P3(γ1, γ2, ρ)) captures 99.98 percent of the variation of Embedded Image. Hence, in order to avoid Embedded Image = 0 constraining the possible values of the CES parameters, I use P3(γA, γB, ρ∙) as a shifter of the mean of Embedded Image during estimation. That way, it counters the mean-shifting that mechanically occurs when Embedded Image ≠ 0. In practice, I am allowing Embedded Image.

Figure 1
Figure 1

Relation between the Mean of Embedded Image and ρ

Notes: The Embedded Image plotted are the results of 1,440 different combinations of γ1, γ2, and ρ parameters in the CES production function Embedded Image = [γ1xρ + γ2yρ + (1 − γ1 − γ2)zρ]1/ρ, where x, y, and z come from 5,000 random draws from independent normal distributions.

The second implication of the normalizations is that the parameters estimated from Equation 1 will not respond to the overall mean changes in skills. However, given that I am comparing the skill trajectories of victims with those of nonvictims, being unable to measure overall mean shifts directly is an innocuous feature of the empirical strategy.15

C. The Problem of Joint Causality

The empirical model presented so far relies on the assumption that scores at t are measured before any victimization has occurred. However, given the survey’s timing (it takes place by the end of the school/calendar year), cognitive scores and noncognitive measures were collected after some victimization had already happened. This may cause a problem of joint causality analogous to the one addressed by Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) when exploring the relationship between skills, manifest scores, and schooling at the time of measurement. They face the simultaneity issue because schooling develops skills and boosts test scores, and also high-skilled people find it easier to achieve higher schooling attainment. Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) show that, by recognizing that the same unobserved skills determine both schooling and scores, they can overcome the joint causality problem and identify the distributions of those skills.

Their approach is well suited for the setting I explore in this paper because it is easy to imagine that—given classmates’ traits—both victimization and the manifest measures observed in the first survey wave are generated by the initial unobserved skills. Therefore, using the Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) framework, I can disentangle skills, manifest measures, and victimization. To do that, I will extend the structure of the measurement system in Equation 3 to incorporate the one proposed by Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004).16

Let T(Mt) denote the observed test score at time τ that depends on the person’s victimization condition at the time of the measurement Embedded Image 10

Note that this implies that the matrixes Embedded Image and Embedded Image are expanded to incorporate victimization-dependent coefficients. Also note that this structure is relevant only for the identification of the initial level of skills. For τ > t, the structure of the measurement system remains as in Equation 4.

V. Data and Institutional Context

I empirically estimate the described model using the Junior High School Panel (JHSP) of the Korean Youth Panel Survey (KYP). This choice is motivated by two main reasons: South Korea’s framework for allocating students to classrooms and critical data features available in the KYP-JHSP.

As explained in Section III, identification relies on the exogenous assignment of classmates. South Korea’s educational setting allows for that, thanks to a 1969 “leveling policy” regulating student placement. The law “requires that elementary school graduates be randomly (by lottery) assigned to middle schools—either public or private—in the relevant residence-based school district” (Kang 2007). The leveling policy also makes the grouping of students by ability and achievement levels “extremely rare.” Therefore, the “non-grouping (or ability mixing) in school exposes students to a classroom peer group that is nearly exogenously and randomly determined” (Kang 2007). Furthermore, the reader should note that, unlike in the United States, middle school students in South Korea have a fixed classroom—and hence, classmates—for all subjects. On top of this distinctive institutional feature, I take advantage of the fact that the KYP-JHSP has a sampling scheme that is critical for identifying the peer interactions that fuel the model. The data consist of a nationally representative sample of a cohort of middle-schoolers interviewed for the first time in 2003 when they were 14 years old. The importance of the sampling scheme relies on the fact that its sampling unit is the entire classroom. Hence, the KYP-JHSP permits a thorough inspection of the complete distribution of traits available in the classroom, a critical feature for identifying Equation 2. The panel consists of 3,449 youths (see descriptive statistics in Table 1). Subjects were consistently interviewed in six waves, one each year.17 During each wave, information was collected in two separate questionnaires: one for the teenager and another for the parents or guardians.

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Another critical feature of the KYP-JHSP regarding this study is that it collects very detailed information on personality traits and behavioral responses through a comprehensive battery of personality questions consistent across waves. The KYP-JHSP inquires about academic performance, student effort, and participation in different kinds of private tutoring. The survey also asks about time allocation, leisure activities, social relations, attachment to friends and family, participation in deviant activities, and victimization in different settings, including bullying. While the survey often asks the children about their parents’ involvement in many aspects of their lives, parents and guardians answer only a short questionnaire covering household composition and their education, occupation, and income.

As with all other personal characteristics collected in the KYP-JHSP, bullying is self-reported by the students. It refers to events where they have been severely teased or bantered, threatened, collectively harassed, severely beaten, or robbed during the last year. Given that the KYP-JHSP collects its data during late November and the Korean school year runs from March to December, one can interpret the question as asking for bullying events during the school year that is about to end.

Even though psychologists define bullying to include more than physical violence (see its definition in the introduction above), due to the wording of the question in the KYP-JHSP, the kids in the study respond to its most direct and less subtle versions of bullying.18 This way of reporting about bullying is in line with the findings in several international studies that find that children “focus on the more obvious and less subtle forms of bullying such as direct verbal and physical abuse and overlook indirect aggression” (Naylor et al. 2010).19 In the same way, the reported incidence of bullying in the KYP-JHSP, presented in Table 1, is in line with other nationally representative studies (Kim, Koh, and Leventhal 2004) and with the incidence—and its year-to-year decline—reported in international studies (OECD 2017; Scheithauer et al. 2006; Ryoo, Wang, and Swearer 2015). Furthermore, it closely mirrors the victimization incidence found in the United States by the School Crime Supplement of the National Crime Victimization Survey (National Center for Education Statistics 2015). For this study, I use the bullying measured in Waves 1, 2, and 3.20

Data and institutional requirements aside, it is worth noting that—as in the United States and many other countries globally—bullying is a critical issue in the South Korean society, usually characterized by ultra-competitive academic environments that praise scholastic achievement.21 Not surprisingly, such environments foster unhappiness and aggressiveness in the classrooms, a fertile ground for bullying. Given the link between bullying and suicides (Kim and Leventhal 2008; Kim et al. 2009), and the striking suicide rate among young people in South Korea,22 the government has deployed active policies aimed at curbing these phenomena.23

A. The Construction of the Manifest Measures for Identification of Unobserved Heterogeneity

As explained while describing the empirical strategy in Online Appendix C, estimating the latent heterogeneity’s distribution parameters requires at least three manifest measures per factor. In this subsection, I present how I constructed those measures for each dimension of the unobserved heterogeneity.

1. Cognitive scores

The KYP-JHSP contains information on grades and academic performance. In particular, I use two self-reported measures on the students’ achievement in (i) math and science and (ii) language (Korean) and social studies, together with the score obtained in a comprehensive test taken at the end of the academic year. The exam is considered high stakes—the scores matter for future applications to high school. Students aiming to enter high-achieving high schools, which will later springboard them to top universities, need to get top marks in these exams consistently.24

Online Appendix C indicates that one requirement for identifying the parameters associated with the correlated latent factors and the adjunct measurement system is to have at least one exclusive measure per factor dimension. That means that there must be at least one cognitive measure whose production function does not include noncognitive skills. Of the three cognitive scores, two of them are course achievement measures, and one is an exam score. Previous literature has shown that course grades may not be orthogonal to noncognitive skills (Heckman, Humphries, and Mader 2011). Course grades—being the summation of multiple tasks throughout the school year, including homework and assessments often relating to classroom behavior—are, to a significant degree, the product of noncognitive skills. Thus, the production function of course grades must be modeled using both cognitive and noncognitive skills as inputs. As shown in Section IV, my model considers this feature of the data and incorporates it into the estimation by allowing the math and science and the language and social studies grades be affected by both skill dimensions.

The yearly exam, on the contrary, is a one-shot assessment and, thus, less dependent on noncognitive skills than course grades. Indeed, children who did their homework and behaved well throughout the year are more likely to have learned more. However, the yearly test does not measure those behaviors directly as course grades do. In fact, Wave 1 correlations between the three cognitive scores and a factor collecting the common variation in noncognitive measures via a principal component analysis show that the yearly exam score is orthogonal to noncognitive variation (0.016, not statistically different from zero). In contrast, the correlations between grades and the noncognitive variation are statistically significant (0.122 for math and 0.103 for language, both statistically different from zero). Based on this evidence, I choose the yearly test as the exclusive measure for the identification of cognitive skills.

2. Noncognitive measures

To identify noncognitive skills, I use measures of locus of control, responsibility, and self-esteem. The KYP-JHSP records the socio-emotional information in categories that group the respondent’s reactions in bins like “strongly agree” or “disagree.” In consequence, and following common practice in the literature, I construct the socio-emotional manifest measures by adding the categorical answers across questions on the same topic.25 This method makes the manifest scores more continuous, which is essential for the estimation procedure.

Regarding the choice of the dedicated noncognitive measure required for the identification of the correlated skills, I choose the measure that correlates the least with a factor collecting the common variation in the cognitive scores via a principal component analysis. The correlation between self-esteem and the cognitive variation is less than a fifth of the correlations between the cognitive variation and the other noncognitive measures. A one standard deviation increase in cognitive skills is associated with an increase in the self-esteem score of only 4.4 percent of a standard deviation. These results provide evidence in favor of using self-esteem and not any of the other noncognitive measures as the dedicated manifest variable for the identification of the latent noncognitive skills factor.

Notably, the yearly test score and self-esteem—the two manifest variables chosen to be the dedicated measures for each skill dimension—are the manifest variables with the lowest piece-wise correlation among all the possible pairs.

C. The Construction of Measures on Skill Investment

I use measures of good parenting as indicator scores for investment choices in noncognitive skills, namely parental physical and verbal abuse, parental control, and parental harmony. The first measure indicates how often the parents beat, physically hurt, yell at, or inappropriately addressed the child. Parental control relates to how well parents know where the child is, who they are with, what they are doing, and when they are returning home. Parental harmony collects information related to the level of care and interest in their life the child feels from their parents.26

The measures used to identify the cognitive skill investment factor relate to each child’s enrollment in private tutoring. South Korean society gives enormous importance to academic success. South Korean’s out of pocket expenditures on education amount to 0.8 percent of the GDP—more than two times the OECD average (Choi and Choi 2015). Hence, it is not uncommon for kids to enroll in after-school academic programs. By age 14, around four-fifths of the sample attend some tutoring. Thus, as manifest variables of cognitive skill investment, I use a scale of how personalized the tutoring sessions are,27 the time spent in tutoring, and the tutoring cost.

VI. Results28

As explained in Section IV.B, estimation was divided into two stages.29 For that reason, I used the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) technique to correct the second stage’s standard errors (Greene 2000). Common controls to all the equations in the structural model were age, gender, family composition (number of older and younger siblings, urban status, broken home status, father’s education), and per capita household monthly income. Below, I will explain the additional variables specific to each equation, that is, exclusion restrictions.

A. Model Fit

In the first step, I estimate the initial distribution of skills (age 14) from Model 10, which incorporates the structure proposed by Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) to address the possible problems of joint causality. Figure 1 in the Web Appendix presents the estimated initial distribution of skills. As expected noncognitive and cognitive skills are positively correlated: corr (θA,t, θB,t) = 0.450.

Table 2 and Figure 2 show that the model fits the actual data extremely well. The former shows that the model matches the incidence of bullying almost exactly and that the means and standard deviations of the simulated scores are very close to the ones obtained from the actual cognitive and noncognitive measures for each victimization state (that is, bullied or not bullied). I cannot reject the null of equality of means in any of the 12 cases.

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Table 2

Goodness-of-Fit of the Model

Figure 2
Figure 2

Actual versus Predicted Scores Cumulative Distributions Conditional on Victimization at t = 1

Notes: Actual (diamond) and predicted (line) cumulative distributions plotted of the following manifest variables: (Panel A) locus of control, (Panel B) irresponsibility, (Panel C) self-esteem, (Panel D) language and social studies, (Panel E) math and sciences, and (Panel F) year exam. The predicted values come from simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model.

Figure 2 plots the predicted values of the manifest variables provided by the model against the actual CDF of each cognitive test or noncognitive measurement observed in the data. The figures show a remarkable fit in all scores, regardless of the victimization condition. I corroborate this by performing a Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) test on the predicted and actual measurement distributions. The results (Table 2) indicate that the predicted scores come from a distribution that is not different from the one the actual scores describe in ten out of the 12 comparisons. The only measurement for which I fail the K-S test is self-esteem, even though the model closely matches its first and second moments. I suspect this is the case because the actual self-esteem distribution has a kink or jump close to the median, which is difficult to fit with smooth and continuous latent factors. When I smooth the observed distributions of self-esteem using kernel approximations, the K-S test statistics get closer to the nonrejection values.

B. Results from the Model of Skill Formation

1. Incidence of victimization

Column 1 in Table 3 shows the relation between skills and selection into bullying. Kids with less noncognitive skills are significantly more likely to be bullied. A one standard deviation decrease in noncognitive skills increases the likelihood of being victimized by 2.26 percentage points (Embedded Image, where Embedded Image). It represents an increase in the probability of being victimized by about one-fifth. Column 1 in Table 3 also shows the importance of the relation between own and peer characteristics has in determining peer victimization. Controlling for their observable characteristics and skill levels, kids placed in a school in which their noncognitive skills are uncommon are significantly more likely to be bullied. The results indicate that the average student’s victimization likelihood drops by one percentage point with each additional classmate with similar noncognitive skill endowments. Interestingly, uncommonness in terms of income also encourages victimization. Bullying probability falls by half a percentage point for each additional classmate with a family income level similar to the one of the prospective victim. These results are in line with the psychological literature that links victimization with those considered weird or unlikeable (for example, Hodges, Malone, and Perry 1997) and remarkably robust to the inclusion of the percentage of classmates that come from troubled families and the percentage of bullies in the classroom.30

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Table 3

Estimating the Model of Skill Formation

The fact that the model relies on identifying unobserved heterogeneity allows me to quantify the victimization probability for the average student and for every combination of skills at a given point in time. Figure 3 shows striking differences in the likelihood of being bullied depending on the level of noncognitive skills. Kids in the first decile of noncognitive skills are twice more likely to be bullied than those in the tenth decile and are 36 percent more likely to be bullied than the average student. In addition, Figure 3 shows that among those with low noncognitive skills, the ones with higher cognitive skills are three percentage points more likely to be victimized than those at the bottom of the cognitive skill distribution. These results reflect the widely held notion that socially awkward smart children face greater chances of being victimized in school.

Figure 3
Figure 3

Probability of Being Bullied

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation.

2. Skills production

Columns 4–7 in Table 3 present the results of estimating the system described by Equation 1. They contain the parameters that, together with the ones related to selection into bullying and the distributions of the unobserved heterogeneity, govern the process of skill formation between ages 14 and 15.31 Two main results stand out—the massive importance of self-productivity and the relatively low productivity of parental investments in skill development.

Self-productivity. Figures 4A and 4B show that high noncognitive skills produce high future noncognitive skills and that marginal increments of those initial skills are very productive (that is, noncognitive skills self-productivity ∂θA,t+1/∂θA,t > 0 for the entire (θA,t, θB,t) space). Table 3 shows that the noncognitive skills’ input shares in the production of future cognitive skills amount to 0.904 and 0.952, depending on the victimization status. These results align well with the estimates found in existing literature.32 Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) report that input share to be 0.868 among white American children between the ages of 7 and 13. Likewise, Figures 4C and 4D show that cognitive skills production relies heavily on past levels of cognitive skills. My estimates indicate that the cognitive skills’ input shares in the production of future cognitive skills among Korean adolescents is 0.838 and 0.864, depending on the victimization status. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) report that input share to be 0.902 and 0.910 among America preadolescents.

Figure 4
Figure 4

θS,t +1 as a Function of θA,t and θB,t

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation.

Cross-productivity. Figures 4A and 4B also demonstrate that cognitive skills are unimportant in the noncognitive skill production process, except that higher initial cognitive skills make the marginal increments of the initial noncognitive skills more productive (that is, ∂2θA,t+1/∂θA,t∂θB,t > 0). Likewise, Figures 4C and 4D show that although the existing levels of noncognitive skills contribute to the cognitive skills’ production process, their contribution is small compared to that of the existing cognitive skills stock. For instance, going from decile one to decile ten in the noncognitive skills distribution has the same effect on the production of cognitive skills as increasing the cognitive skills input by one decile.

Productivity of investment. Table 3 indicates parental investments are relatively unimpactful in the production of skills.33 The parental investment’s input shares range between 0.03 and 0.057. These meager input shares among older children are also found in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) (0.02 and 0.055 in the cognitive and noncognitive skills’ production functions) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) (0.087 in the production of the cognitive skills).

My results indicate a strong path dependence in which skills produce skills, setting a high cost in terms of future stock of skills for those who start the accumulation process in the lower quantiles of the skill distribution. My results also show that investment choices do not reverse this path dependence. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 show that investment choices in noncognitive skills depend greatly on the past level of noncognitive skills, and investment choices in cognitive skills depend greatly on past levels of that skill in the first place. Hence, people with high skills pass their high stock on to the next period and are more prone to invest in their development.34

3. Effects of bullying on skill production and future bullying

Table 4 shows the effect of bullying on the accumulation of cognitive and noncognitive skills. To calculate this, I compare the next period skills of those who would be selected into bullying with those who would not, given a particular level of period skills. That is, Embedded Image. In Table 4, I present two summarizing estimates of the effect bullying has on skill accumulation. First, I present the mean average treatment effect: Embedded Image, where I aggregate the treatment affects across all levels of period t skills. Second, I show the average treatment effect for the average student: Embedded Image

for S ∈ {A, B}, where Embedded Image represents skill S mean. I find that, on average, bullying impedes noncognitive skills accumulation by −0.249. That is equivalent to a reduction in noncognitive skill accumulation of 39.9 percent of a standard deviation, a sizable effect. It implies a reduction of 33.6 percent of a standard deviation in the language test score and a reduction of 28.9 percent of a standard deviation in the math test score. These skill losses imply that the average kid would be 19 percentage points more likely to report being sick recently, 5.5 percentage points more likely to smoke, and 10.5 percentage points more likely to drink alcoholic beverages. The stock of skills lost also translates to setbacks in mental health. They equate to increases of 48.77 percent of a standard deviation in the depression symptom scale, 38.1 percent of a standard deviation in the levels of stress caused by insecurities regarding their image, and a third of a standard deviation in the levels of stress caused by issues regarding school.35

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Table 4

ATE of Being Bullied on Next Period Skills

The same estimation shows there is no statistically significant effect of bullying on cognitive skill accumulation. These results indicate that, as expected, bullying is much more costly in the noncognitive dimension than in the cognitive one. Although victims might skip school, their learning ability is not affected as gravely as their ability to self-regulate, overcome obstacles, see themselves positively, or relate with others. Note that even if cognitive skills are unaffected, grades drop because of the effect noncognitive skills have on them. Note that the fact that bullying does not affect the accumulation of cognitive skills could be due to the nature of the victimization itself or that cognitive skills are less malleable than noncognitive skills during adolescence (Walsh 2004; Kautz et al. 2014). Then, as a robustness check, I estimate a version of the model in which cognitive skills are allowed to evolve but are not subject to the effects of victimization. The results collected in Web Appendix 3.2 show that the impact of victimization on noncognitive skill accumulation remains unchanged.

Figure 5A presents the effect of bullying on the next period noncognitive skills for each initial skills level. It shows that the kids who suffer the greatest negative impact come into the process with low stocks of skills. Victims with low levels of skills lose almost half of a standard deviation of noncognitive skills, while victims with high stocks of skills lose a third of a standard deviation. In particular, those who start with low cognitive skills face harsher consequences. However, due to the positive correlation between cognitive and noncognitive skills, those with low cognitive skills are very likely to be those with low levels of noncognitive ones. Such treatment effect heterogeneity based on the initial levels of skills and the fact that victimization also depends on them yield a very interesting result—kids with low initial levels of skills are not only more likely to be bullied, but also its consequences are stronger on them.36 Table 5 attests to that. It shows how bullying shifts students to lower deciles of the next period skills distribution. It shows that if students from the lower 40 percent of the noncognitive skill distribution at t were to be victimized, they would end up belonging to the lowest noncognitive skills decile at t + 1. Furthermore, if students from the bottom 80 percent of the noncognitive skill distribution at t were to be victimized, they would end up belonging to the lowest half of the noncognitive skills distribution in the next period. Notably, those who start with abundant stocks of skills fall closer to their original place in the skills distribution. Victims from the top decile at t end up in the ninth decile at t + 1.

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Table 5

Decile of θA,t+1 and Victimization Probability in t + 2 that Students Would End up Facing if Victimized in t + 1, by Skills Decile in t

Figure 5
Figure 5

E[θS,t + 1|θA,t, θB,t, Mt+1 = 1] − E[θS,t + 1|θA,t, θB,t, Mt+1 = 0]

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation.

Such skill depletion between t and t + 1 due to bullying increases the chances of being bullied again in t + 2. The bottom row of Table 5 shows evidence of that. The likelihood of being bullied in t + 2 for those bullied in t + 1 exceeds 4.62—the unconditional probability of being victimized at that period. Using the dynamic features of my model, I can calculate the ATE of prior bullying on the chances of being victimized again. To do so, the model exploits two facts: (i) that victimization in t + 2 depends on t + 1 skills, as indicated in Figure 6A and (ii) that those victimized have their skills t + 1 depleted. In consequence, I find that those bullied in t + 1 are, on average, 1.65 percentage points more likely to be bullied again next period. That effect is not only statistically significant but economically meaningful. It represents a massive 34.6 percent increase relative to the overall victimization incidence in t + 2. When disaggregating the effect by the initial level of skills, Figure 6B shows that the effect is significant for the students who start the process with relatively low skills. For instance, for students whose initial skill endowments place them in the first decile of the noncognitive skill distribution, being bullied in t + 1 increases the probability of being victimized in t + 2 by 2.04 percentage points. That amounts to a 42.8 percent increase relative to the overall victimization incidence in t + 2.

Figure 6
Figure 6

Victimization in t + 2

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation. Panel A presents the probability of being bullied in t + 2 by skill levels at t + 1. Panel B presents how the probability of being victimized at t + 2 changes due to having been victimized in t + 1 for every initial level of noncognitive skills. Namely, E[Mt+2|Mt+1 = 1, θA,t] − E[Mt+2|Mt+1 = 0, θA,t]. The spikes represent the 90 percent confidence intervals.

The channel through which these effects materialize is, of course, skill depletion. Low noncognitive-skilled students are more likely to be bullied in t + 1. Due to that, they accumulate fewer noncognitive skills during that period relative to what they would have if they had not been bullied. Now, with substantially less noncognitive skills, they face a higher probability of being victimized in t + 2. These results show the importance of the model’s dynamics. Even though the overall incidence of bullying drops dramatically from year to year, victimization becomes more selective, as described in the psychological literature by Nylund et al. (2007) and Reijntjes et al. (2010). Those who end up being bullied are most likely those who were bullied before.

All the evidence presented in this paper confirms the existence of a self-reinforcing mechanism: kids who start the process with low levels of skills are more likely to be bullied and thus have their stock of skills depleted. These forces send them in a downward spiral by making them even more at risk of being victims of bullying in the future.37 Subsequent bullying events will be much more harmful, preventing them from acquiring the noncognitive skills they lack.

4. Complementarities

As explained in Section III, an essential feature of the model is that it allows the analysis of complementarities between skills and bullying. Namely, the measurement of how much a marginal change in previous period skills modifies bullying’s effect; that is, Embedded Image

According to Figure 7A, marginally increasing the initial levels of noncognitive skills will result in small reductions in bullying’s negative effect on future period skills. This result attests to the fact that the impact of bullying is relatively constant across the entire noncognitive skills distribution. The palliation of the negative effect due to a marginal increase in noncognitive skills is larger for those with above the mean initial noncognitive skills.

Figure 7
Figure 7

Static Complementarity

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation. The scatter plot presents the static complementarity measures at 750 points along the skill distributions. The line represents a local polynomial approximation.

On the other hand, Figure 7B shows that marginal increases in initial levels of cognitive skills have larger effects in palliating the negative effect of bullying on noncognitive skills. In fact, those adverse effects would shrink by four percentage points or 16 percent for the average kid. For those in the sixth and seventh decile, the palliation effect is even larger, reducing the negative effect of bullying on noncognitive skills by about a fourth.

Even though I showed that investment in skills during middle school years is often unproductive, the static complementarity results suggest that even a tiny bit of skill accumulation during earlier years would have an immense impact not only in deterring bullying but also in lessening its consequences among those that are more at risk.

VII. Policy Implications

Several antibullying campaigns have been deployed all around the world in an ambitious effort to eliminate this unwanted phenomenon.38 My findings indicate there are at least two fronts on which policymakers can work. First is the development of noncognitive skills. Noncognitive-skilled kids will be less likely to be victimized. Moreover, if they happen to be bullied, the impact on their skill accumulation path is much lessened. The strong dependence of current skill levels on past skill levels heightens the importance of developing noncognitive skills at young ages.

The second implication of my results relates to classroom assignment. Column 1 in Table 3 shows that, given skill levels and observable characteristics, children with uncommon traits are more likely to be targeted by bullies. This finding leads to a policy-relevant question: to what extent can allocating children to more homogenous classrooms deter victimization? To answer this, I simulate the model with an extreme—unfeasible in practice—mechanism of allocating students to classrooms, Consider it a benchmark scenario that places students in classrooms with kids with similar stocks of noncognitive skills, as measured by the self-esteem score. This exercise ignores geographical distances. It sorts the universe of students with respect to their self-esteem scores and splits them into classrooms according to the typical classroom size in South Korea.

Figure 8 presents the results of these simulations. As in Figure 3, it plots the likelihood of being bullied for every skill level. A comparison between these two figures shows the massive impact of reducing in-classroom noncognitive skill heterogeneity on the likelihood of being victimized. The benchmark case in Figure 8 shows that by arranging students with classmates that have similar levels of noncognitive skills, the overall likelihood of victimization falls from 11.5 percent to 2.8 percent. This dramatic reduction is across the entire skills domain to the point that almost everyone has a probability of being victimized that is not statistically different from zero. Only those who start the period with very low noncognitive skills would still face a nonzero likelihood of being bullied at around 4 percent. However, they would face a sizable reduction in their hazard of being bullied on the order of 11 percentage points.

Figure 8
Figure 8

Classroom Allocation Simulations: Benchmark

Notes: Results based on 40,000 simulations based on the estimated parameters of the model of skill formation.

Of course, this exercise ignores all other possible consequences that the homogenization of classrooms along skill lines might have. Being in a skill-diverse classroom might be beneficial to students—in particular, those not victimized—in other domains. My simulation cannot specify whether the benefit of reduced bullying due to the homogenization of classrooms outweighs the potential positive implications of a skill-diverse classroom. The exercise shows that one implication of homogenization along skill lines is less bullying.

VIII. Conclusions

This work develops and estimates a structural model of skill accumulation that introduces endogenous social interactions as drivers of the skill formation process. The model uses several dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity and in-classroom variation of student characteristics to identify the endogenous selection of bullying victims. My findings indicate the existence of a vicious cycle between victimization and skill depletion. I find that bullying is disproportionately suffered by students who lack socio-emotional skills, and among those, the smart students are more likely to be victimized. In line with psychological studies, my findings suggest that conditional on the level of skills, kids with uncommon characteristics relative to those of their classmates are more likely to be victimized.

The estimation showed that bullying is very costly in terms of the skills lost from one period to the next. Bulling at age 15 reduces noncognitive skill accumulation by a 40 percent of a standard deviation for the average kid. That effect is a third greater for kids with low initial levels of skills. Static complementarity shows that the current stock of cognitive skills greatly influences the “negative productivity” of the bullying event.

These results show the existence of a self-reinforcing mechanism, in which initial levels of skill become crucial, suggesting that policies aimed to foster noncognitive skills at early ages will greatly reduce victimization occurrence. My model also indicates that allocating students to more homogeneous classrooms might reduce victimization by preventing kids with uncommon characteristics from being isolated and targeted by bullies.

This paper intends to contribute to the human development literature in economics by exploring how school-aged kids’ victimization may hamper the development of successful adults. In the process, this paper contributes to the skill formation literature by introducing endogenous social interactions as triggers of phenomena that have long-lasting consequences. This opens a promising research agenda. For instance, researchers can use the model to analyze other types of disruptive behaviors, the role that gender plays in classroom dynamics vis-á-vis those social interactions, or—data permitting—the introduction of physical traits as determinants of victimization. Furthermore, given the importance of initial levels of skills, we should inquire about how these negative social interactions affect younger children’s skill accumulation.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Sergio Urzua for his invaluable support and thanks John Ham, John Shea, Sebastián Galiani, Soohyung Lee, Salvador Navarro, Greg Veramendi, James Heckman, and Matt Wiswall, as well as participants of the Global Education Forum at Seoul, Republic of Korea, and the seminar participants at the University of Maryland, the Swedish Institute for Social Research of Stockholm University, Purdue University, the Psychology Department BBL of Purdue University, LACEA-LAMES meeting (São Paulo 2015), Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (Bristol, UK 2017), Western Economic Association International Meetings (San Diego 2017), and European Economics Association Meetings (Lisbon, Portugal 2017). The Web Appendix with supplementary material is available at https://business.purdue.edu/faculty/msarzosa/jhrjointappendices.pdf. The author does not have permission to disclose the data, which are property of the National Youth Policy Institute of Korea. However, interested researchers can obtain access to them by contacting the institute. The author did not have access to information leading to the identification of individuals. The data analysis was carried out in a secure server.

Footnotes

  • ↵1. Injury or discomfort can be caused by violent contact, by insults, by communicating private or inaccurate information and by other unpleasant behaviors like exclusion from a group (Wang, Iannotti, and Nansel 2009).

  • ↵2. Cognitive skills—defined as “all forms of knowing and awareness such as perceiving, conceiving, remembering, reasoning, judging, imagining, and problem-solving” (APA 2006)—and noncognitive skills—defined as relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that allow people to recognize and control their emotions and reactions, establish and maintain positive relationships, make responsible decisions, and set and achieve positive goals (Borghans et al. 2008; OECD 2014)—are critical to the development of successful lives (see, for example, Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995; Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2001; Heckman and Rubinstein 2001; Duckworth and Seligman 2005; Heckman. Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Urzua 2008; Saltiel, Sarzosa, and Urzúa 2017). Although psychologists treat them differently, most related works in economics use noncognitive and socio-emotional skills interchangeably (Saltiel, Sarzosa, and Urzúa 2017). Sometimes they are also referred to as soft skills (Heckman and Kautz 2012).

  • ↵3. Well-established facts about child victimization in the psychological literature inspire this two-way relation. Namely, that bullying victims suffer grave and long-lasting consequences in terms of their emotional well-being (Smith and Brain 2000; OECD 2017, among many others) and that the likelihood of victimization increases dramatically when the child has some behavioral vulnerability (Hodges, Malone, and Perry 1997; Reijntjes et al. 2010).

  • ↵4. The psychology and sociology literatures have been prolific in examining bullying as a social phenomenon. Among many findings, they have established that school and class size are not significant determinants of the likelihood of bullying, nor are personal characteristics like disabilities, obesity, hygiene, posture, and dress (Olweus 1997). However, victims are often smaller than attackers (Smith Madsen, and Moody 1999), and victims have more odd mannerisms than nonvictimized kids (Lowenstein 1978). Victims have fewer friends and are more likely to be absent from school (NAS 2016). Bullied children generally have less self-esteem and have a negative view of their situation (Björkqvist, Ekman, and Lagerspetz 1982; Kochel, Ladd, and Rudolph 2012). They are also more likely to feel lonely (Dake, Price, and Telljohann 2003). These victims’ characterizations highlight the importance of including explicit relation between bullying and personality throughout the analysis.

  • ↵5. Empirical estimates back up the theoretical claim of skills inducing higher levels of investment only at very early stages of life (that is, before two years of age) (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010).

  • ↵6. See, for instance, Hart and Risley (1995); Cunha et al. (2006); Heckman and Masterov (2007); Cabrera, Shannon, and Tamis-LeMonda (2007); Kiernan and Huerta (2008); Tough (2012); Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix (2017).

  • ↵7. See OECD (2014) for a full framework about such contexts.

  • ↵8. Studies have shown that adolescents do not disclose their victimization to adults because they are ashamed, they underplay its consequences, or they fear their parents could make their problem worse (deLara 2012; Larranaga, Yubero, and Navarro 2018). Other studies show that adolescents see disclosing being bullied to a parent as their last resort due to the fact that disclosure has been associated with more serious bullying experiences (Smith, Shu, and Madsen 2001; deLara 2008).

  • ↵9. Recently, the CES specification has been under criticism due to its strong location and scale assumptions (Agostinelli and Wiswall 2016b; Del Bono, Kinsler, and Pavan 2020; Freyberger 2020). I will deal with these issues in Section IV.B.2.

  • ↵10. In that sense, this selection problem relates to the issues studied by the social interactions literature as in Schelling (1971), Pollak (1976), and Manski (1993), where agents interact through their decisions. The problem with bullying is that no one decides to be a victim. Hence, while the social interactions literature explains, “why do members of the same group tend to behave similarly” (Manski 2000), I am instead interested in answering: Why is this kid chosen among the rest?

  • ↵11. Psychology literature has identified six types of classmates: ringleader bullies, follower bullies, reinforcers, defenders, bystanders, and victims (Salmivalli et al. 1996). Due to data and computational restrictions, I compress the types of classmates to three: bullies, bystanders, and victims.

  • ↵12. Dake, Price, and Telljohann (2003) show that students that scored higher on a scale of social acceptance were less likely to be bullied by their peers.

  • ↵13. In this paper, I use the terms latent variables and unobserved heterogeneity interchangeably. While the term latent variables is widely used in statistics, the literature in labor economics prefers the term unobserved heterogeneity to differentiate it from the latent variable models that give the basis of probits, logits, censored, and truncated estimations.

  • ↵14. See the details of these two variables in Sarzosa and Urzua (2021). The family violence measure comes from the following questions: 1. I always get along well with brothers or sisters, 2. I frequently see parents verbally abuse each other, 3. I frequently see one of my parents beat the other one, 4. I am often verbally abused by parents, and 5. I am often severely beaten by parents. Answers were aggregated and considered as peers that come from violent families those who have scores above the mean. This variable is somewhat similar to the classroom proportion of incarcerated parents variable used as instrument by Eriksen, Nielsen, and Simonsen (2014) in that it relates household emotional trauma with violent behavior in school as in Carrell and Hoekstra (2010).

  • ↵15. Urzua (2008) shows that, under mild linearity assumptions in measurement systems (Equations 3 and 4), the mean of the skills is given by the constant terms in Embedded Image and Embedded Image; call them Embedded Image and Embedded Image for τ = {t, t + 1}. Therefore, I can retrieve overall mean changes of skills from the difference between these constants. For instance, an overall mean change of skill A between t and t + 1 is given by Embedded Image Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) make use of a similar result to show that a model like Equation 1 can be identified without normalizing Embedded Image.

  • ↵16. Its identification requires two additional assumptions. First, the assumption of separability between the observed and unobserved part in every equation of the measurement system. Second, the assumption of orthogonality across the error terms in the complete measurement system. The first assumption is trivial given the setup of the empirical model. The second one is a very mild condition, as every equation is being controlled not only for observable characteristics but also for the unobserved heterogeneity, which is theorized to be the only source of nonzero covariance between the unobservable parts of all the equations that comprise the complete measurement system.

  • ↵17. As in any longitudinal survey, attrition can an issue. By Wave 2, 92 percent of the sample remained; by Wave 3, 91 percent did so; by Wave 4, 90 percent; and by Wave 5, 86 percent remained in the sample. However, only the first three waves were used for most of the estimations presented in this paper. Online Appendix A presents an analysis on the attrited observations. In particular, being a bully or being a victim of bullies is not a determinant for leaving the sample.

  • ↵18. Nonetheless, under this limited definition, I find that there is at least one bully and one victim in every sampled classroom. This goes in line with the findings of Schuster (1999) in German schools.

  • ↵19. See, for instance, Madsen (1996); Smith et al. (2002).

  • ↵20. The KYPS-JHS collects information about the incidence of bullying (that is, a dichotomous variable) and about its frequency. However, the reported frequency has very little variation. This may stem from the fact that bullying—by definition—implies a repetitive behavior. Thus, children might report multiple attacks under one bully–bullied relation.

  • ↵21. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/sunday/south-koreas-education-system-hurts-students.html?_r=0 (accessed August 4, 2023).

  • ↵22. Suicide is the largest cause of death for people between 15 and 24, killing 13 for every 100,000 people in this age range. One school-aged kid (10–19 years old) commits suicide each day (Statistics Korea 2012). Overall, South Korea has the single highest suicide rate in the world: 32 deaths per 100,000 people, according to the World Health Organization (http://www.who.int/gho/mental_health/suicide_rates_crude/en/, accessed August 4, 2023).

  • ↵23. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26080052 (accessed August 4, 2023). Reports indicate that since 2012, the government installed more than 100,000 closed-circuit cameras in school facilities to prevent bullying and prosecute its perpetrators.

  • ↵24. Compulsory schooling in South Korea finishes at the end of middle school. However, we should note that 99.7 percent of middle school graduates continue their education into high school. In 2010, the high school graduation rate in South Korea reached 94 percent, the highest among OECD countries (OECD 2012).

  • ↵25. To create the locus of control measure, I aggregated the answers to three questions: 1. I have confidence in my own decision; 2. I believe that I can deal with my problems by myself; 3. I am taking full responsibility of my own life. To create the self-esteem index I aggregated the answers to: 1. I think that I have a good character; 2. I think that I am a competent person; 3. I think that I am a worthy person; 4. Sometimes I think that I am a worthless person (the negative of); 5. Sometimes I think that I am a bad person (the negative of); 6. I generally feel that I am a failure in life (the negative of); 7. If I do something wrong, people around me will blame me much (the negative of); 8. If I do something wrong, I will be put to shame by people around me (the negative of). Finally, I created the irresponsibility index by adding the answers to the following questions: 1. I jump into exciting things even if I have to take an examination tomorrow; 2. I abandon a task once it becomes hard and laborious to do; 3. I am apt to enjoy risky activities.

  • ↵26. See Online Appendix E for a detailed explanation of the questions used to create each score.

  • ↵27. This manifest score collects information on the nature of the extra-school classes taken. That is, whether the classes were entirely private, with few classmates, with many classmates, or through the internet. Students gave this type of information about their tutoring for every subject (for example, language, math, science), and based on that, I created aggregated measures.

  • 28. To keep the paper within a reasonable length, I placed some of the background estimates and tables with the complete set of controls in the Web Appendix available at https://business.purdue.edu/faculty/msarzosa/jhrjointappendices.pdf.

  • ↵29. First-stage estimations show that skill distributions for t and t + 1 are far from normal and that there is a positive correlation between both dimensions of skills: 0.4499 and 0.358, respectively. Thus, kids with high levels of one skill tend to have high levels of the other skills. Interestingly, I find that the variance of noncognitive skills increases for higher levels of cognitive skills. Hence, socio-emotional abilities, although positively correlated with cognitive skills, are less so for smarter kids. A full set of parameter estimates can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 and Figures 1(a) and 1(b) in Section 2.1 of the Web Appendix.

  • ↵30. See the robustness checks in Section 2.3 in the Web Appendix.

  • ↵31. Point estimates of ρ suggest that the production of skills among nonvictims follows a Cobb–Douglas specification (that is, ρ ≈ 0). That does not seem to be the case for victims, especially in their noncognitive skills, where the point estimate reach ρ = 0.357. Although they are not statistically different from zero, the point estimates highlight one advantage of the method introduced in Section IV.B.2: estimating a Cobb–Douglas is only one of the possible results of the estimation. The fact that they are not statistically different from zero could be due to a lack of power as victims comprise only 11 percent of the sample, and the model—relying on unobserved heterogeneity and nonlinear functions—is data-intensive.

  • ↵32. Comparing estimates of skill production functions with those available in the literature can be difficult due to the vast differences in contexts and ages of the subjects on which researchers have data. The closest contexts to the one I analyze are those in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a). They analyze data from a developed country, the United States. Also, the students’ age ranges in their studies are close to the age range in my sample, although they do not overlap. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) follows children ages 7–13, and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) estimate a model of skill formation of children ages 11 years old. Other existing papers study very young children in developing countries (see Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix. 2017; Attanasio et al. 2020b,c). Notwithstanding the significant differences, even in those contexts, papers still find evidence of high self-productivity of skills and the low productivity of parental investments.

  • ↵33. Details and results of the estimation of the latent factors of parental investments can be found in Section 2.2 in the Web Appendix.

  • ↵34. In Section 3.3 of the Web Appendix, I present the results of a model where noncognitive investments directly affect the production function of cognitive skills. The results do not differ from the ones presented in Table 3. If anything, the share parameters of noncognitive investment on cognitive skill development are even smaller than the investment share parameters estimated in the main model where a distinct cognitive investment factor affects cognitive skill production.

  • ↵35. In Section 2.4 of the Web Appendix, I present detailed result of estimating models of unobserved heterogeneity at age 16 of the form Embedded Image, where Y is depression, stress in different situations, and the likelihood of smoking, drinking alcohol, felling healthy, being satisfied with life, or going to college by age 19.

  • ↵36. In Web Appendix 4, I explore a different source of heterogeneity in the consequences of being bullied. I estimate a model that allows for different production functions depending on the number of bullies in the classroom. I find that the negative impact on noncognitive skill development of being bullied is larger in classrooms with lower fractions of perpetrators. I also find that the ATE on the students in classrooms with a lower fraction of bullies has a steeper gradient with respect to the initial level of noncognitive skills than in classrooms with a high fraction of bullies. A logic that considers that the sense of desperation might differ depending on the context where the victimization is taking place can explain these results. Classrooms with a higher fraction of bullies have more victims. Thus, a victim in a high-bullying classroom has many peers going through the same as them, while a victim in a low-bullying classroom could feel a greater sense of desperation as they will feel more of a target.

  • ↵37. The notion of a vicious cycle between emotional and behavioral problems and victimization has been explored in psychology. See Reijntjes et al. (2010) and Bowes et al. (2013).

  • ↵38. See the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program and the U.S. Education Department stopbullying.gov program.

  • Received August 1, 2019.
  • Accepted August 1, 2021.

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Journal of Human Resources: 59 (1)
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 59, Issue 1
1 Jan 2024
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Victimization and Skill Accumulation
Miguel Sarzosa
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2024, 59 (1) 242-279; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0819-10371R2

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Victimization and Skill Accumulation
Miguel Sarzosa
Journal of Human Resources Jan 2024, 59 (1) 242-279; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0819-10371R2
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  • Article
    • Abstract
    • I. Introduction
    • II. Related Literature
    • III. Skill Formation and Bullying
    • IV. Empirical Strategy
    • V. Data and Institutional Context
    • VI. Results28
    • VII. Policy Implications
    • VIII. Conclusions
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