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Research ArticleArticles

Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

View ORCID ProfileMathilde Godard, View ORCID ProfilePierre Koning and View ORCID ProfileMaarten Lindeboom
Journal of Human Resources, September 2024, 59 (5) 1353-1386; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
Mathilde Godard
Mathilde Godard is CNRS researcher at Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, LEDa .
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  • ORCID record for Mathilde Godard
  • For correspondence: mathilde.godard{at}cnrs.fr
Pierre Koning
Pierre Koning is economics professor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, IZA, and TI.
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Maarten Lindeboom
Maarten Lindeboom is economics professor at the Vrije Universiteit, IZA, TI, the Centre for Health Economics, and Monash University.
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Journal of Human Resources: 59 (5)
Journal of Human Resources
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1 Sep 2024
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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning, Maarten Lindeboom
Journal of Human Resources Sep 2024, 59 (5) 1353-1386; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1

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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning, Maarten Lindeboom
Journal of Human Resources Sep 2024, 59 (5) 1353-1386; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
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