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Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
Alan B. Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter
Published online before print October 13, 2021, 1019-10483; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483
Alan B. Krueger
1Industrial Relations Section, Firestone Library, Room A2H, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 and NBER
Orley Ashenfelter
2Orley Ashenfelter, Industrial Relations Section, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 and NBER,
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- Alan B. Krueger
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- Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission’s
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In this issue
Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 59, Issue 2
1 Mar 2024
Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
Alan B. Krueger, Orley Ashenfelter
Journal of Human Resources Oct 2021, 1019-10483; DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1019-10483
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