<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naidu, Suresh</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Posner, Eric A.</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Human Resources</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021-06-09 13:06:29</style></date></pub-dates></dates><elocation-id><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">0219-10030R1</style></elocation-id><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10030R1</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Recent literature has suggested that antitrust regulation is an appropriate response to labor market monopsony. This article qualifies the primacy of antitrust by arguing that a significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. If monopsony is pervasive under conditions of laissez-faire, antitrust is likely to play only a partial role in remedying it, and other legal and policy instruments to intervene in the labor market will be required.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>