TY - JOUR T1 - Teacher Pension Plan Incentives, Retirement Decisions, and Workforce Quality JF - Journal of Human Resources JO - J Hum Resour SP - 272 LP - 303 DO - 10.3368/jhr.57.1.1218-9912R2 VL - 57 IS - 1 AU - Shawn Ni AU - Michael Podgursky AU - Xiqian Wang Y1 - 2022/01/01 UR - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/57/1/272.abstract N2 - We analyze late-career teacher turnover induced by pension incentives. Using longitudinal data on Tennessee teachers, we find high-quality teachers less likely to retire conditional on age and experience. We estimate a structural model for retirement that allows high- and lower-quality teachers to have different work–retirement preferences and use it to simulate the effect of alternative pension plan designs. Enhancements to traditional plans accelerate teacher retirement and reduce average teacher quality, whereas defined contribution (DC) plans have the opposite effect. Under the current plan, targeted retention bonuses would delay retirement of high-quality teachers at relatively modest cost. ER -