PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Godard, Mathilde
AU  - Koning, Pierre
AU  - Lindeboom, Maarten
TI  - Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
AID  - 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
DP  - 2024 Sep 01
TA  - Journal of Human Resources
PG  - 1353--1386
VI  - 59
IP  - 5
4099  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/59/5/1353.short
4100  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/59/5/1353.full
AB  - We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch disability insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “gatekeeper protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40 percent in one year) following the reform, particularly among those with difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals who were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by self-screening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.