<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balasubramanian, Natarajan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chang, Jin Woo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sakakibara, Mariko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sivadasan, Jagadeesh</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Starr, Evan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Human Resources</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022-04-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">S349-S396</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/jhr.monopsony.1218-9931R1</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">S</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We study the relationship between the enforceability of covenants not to compete (CNCs) and employee mobility and wages. We exploit a 2015 CNC ban for technology workers in Hawaii and find that this ban increased mobility by 11 percent and new-hire wages by 4 percent. We supplement the Hawaii evaluation with a cross-state analysis using matched employer–employee data. We find that eight years after starting a job in an average-enforceability state, technology workers have about 8 percent fewer jobs and 4.6 percent lower cumulative earnings relative to equivalent workers starting in a nonenforcing state. These results are consistent with CNC enforceability increasing monopsony power.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>