PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Mathilde Godard
AU  - Pierre Koning
AU  - Maarten Lindeboom
TI  - Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
AID  - 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
DP  - 2022 Apr 05
TA  - Journal of Human Resources
PG  - 1120-11323R1
4099  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2022/03/31/jhr.1120-11323R1.short
4100  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2022/03/31/jhr.1120-11323R1.full
AB  - We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.