RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance JF Journal of Human Resources JO J Hum Resour FD University of Wisconsin Press SP 1120-11323R1 DO 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1 A1 Mathilde Godard A1 Pierre Koning A1 Maarten Lindeboom YR 2022 UL http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2022/03/31/jhr.1120-11323R1.abstract AB We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.