RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Quality and selection in regulated professions
JF Journal of Human Resources
JO J Hum Resour
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 0824-13810R1
DO 10.3368/jhr.0824-13810R1
A1 Basso, Gaetano
A1 Brandimarti, Eleonora
A1 Pellizzari, Michele
A1 Pica, Giovanni
YR 2025
UL http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2025/12/02/jhr.0824-13810R1.abstract
AB Entry into many occupations is regulated to screen out the least able candidates, but available evidence suggests that this objective is rarely achieved. Using microdata covering the universe of Italian law school graduates (2007-2013), we show that this result is largely due to the strong intergenerational transmission of occupations within regulated professions. We find that having relatives already active as lawyers significantly increases the probability of passing the entry exam and boosts earnings, particularly for those who performed poorly in law school.