<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">González-Rozada, Martín</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ruffo, Hernán</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Welfare Effects of Unemployment Insurance in Argentina</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Human Resources</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026-01-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">240-273</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/jhr.0622-12372R1</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unemployment insurance transfers should balance the provision of consumption to the unemployed with the disincentive effects on search. Developing countries face the additional challenge of workers hiding employment and income in informal jobs. By exploiting the kinks in the schedule of transfers in Argentina, we find that higher benefits moderately affect job-finding rates and significantly increase reemployment wages. Using a model with random wage offers, we derive a sufficient statistics formula and calibrate it with our estimates to show that welfare could rise substantially if benefits were increased in Argentina. Importantly, our conclusion is relevant for the median eligible worker.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>