<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kim, Pyoungsik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Search, Acute Illness, and Absenteeism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Human Resources</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026-03-11 13:16:04</style></date></pub-dates></dates><elocation-id><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">0923-13099R4</style></elocation-id><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/jhr.0923-13099R4</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper examines the economic costs of absenteeism from acute illness, which reduces labor market participation and burdens workers and firms. I extend a search, matching, and bargaining framework to incorporate medical care use, illness dynamics, health capital, and employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I estimate the model and find that acute illness lowers productivity, raises medical expenditures, and reduces welfare. Counterfactual analyses show subsidizing health capital improves total welfare. Moreover, while both a universal ESHI mandate and a penaltybased policy expand coverage, the penalty-based approach yields greater welfare gains.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>