@article {Helland309, author = {Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok}, title = {Does Three Strikes Deter?}, volume = {XLII}, number = {2}, pages = {309--330}, year = {2007}, doi = {10.3368/jhr.XLII.2.309}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, abstract = {We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California{\textquoteright}s three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17{\textendash}20 percent.}, issn = {0022-166X}, URL = {https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XLII/2/309}, eprint = {https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XLII/2/309.full.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources} }