PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Helland, Eric
AU  - Tabarrok, Alexander
TI  - Does Three Strikes Deter?
AID  - 10.3368/jhr.XLII.2.309
DP  - 2007 Mar 31
TA  - Journal of Human Resources
PG  - 309--330
VI  - XLII
IP  - 2
4099  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XLII/2/309.short
4100  - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XLII/2/309.full
SO  - J Hum Resour2007 Mar 31; XLII
AB  - We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California’s three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17–20 percent.