RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Does Three Strikes Deter?
JF Journal of Human Resources
JO J Hum Resour
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 309
OP 330
DO 10.3368/jhr.XLII.2.309
VO XLII
IS 2
A1 Helland, Eric
A1 Tabarrok, Alexander
YR 2007
UL http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XLII/2/309.abstract
AB We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California’s three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17–20 percent.