RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Marriage and Economic Incentives
JF Journal of Human Resources
JO J Hum Resour
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 942
OP 963
DO 10.3368/jhr.XXXVIII.4.942
VO XXXVIII
IS 4
A1 Wei-Yin Hu
YR 2003
UL http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XXXVIII/4/942.abstract
AB Can economic incentives be used to affect marriage behavior and slow the growth of single-parent families? This paper provides new evidence on the effects of welfare benefit levels on the marital decisions of poor women. Exogenous variation in welfare benefit incentives arises from a randomized experiment carried out in California that allows me to measure responses beyond simple year-to-year changes in benefit levels. I find that a regime of lower benefits and stronger work incentives encourages married aid recipients to stay married, but has little effect on the probability that single-parent aid recipients marry. The effects on married recipients become larger over time, suggesting that long-run effects may exist.