TY - JOUR T1 - Marriage and Economic Incentives JF - Journal of Human Resources JO - J Hum Resour SP - 942 LP - 963 DO - 10.3368/jhr.XXXVIII.4.942 VL - XXXVIII IS - 4 AU - Wei-Yin Hu Y1 - 2003/10/02 UR - http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/XXXVIII/4/942.abstract N2 - Can economic incentives be used to affect marriage behavior and slow the growth of single-parent families? This paper provides new evidence on the effects of welfare benefit levels on the marital decisions of poor women. Exogenous variation in welfare benefit incentives arises from a randomized experiment carried out in California that allows me to measure responses beyond simple year-to-year changes in benefit levels. I find that a regime of lower benefits and stronger work incentives encourages married aid recipients to stay married, but has little effect on the probability that single-parent aid recipients marry. The effects on married recipients become larger over time, suggesting that long-run effects may exist. ER -