<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fernandes, Ana P.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ferreira, Priscila</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winters, L. Alan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Effect of Competition on Executive Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Human Resources</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017-04-19 15:11:24</style></date></pub-dates></dates><elocation-id><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">0215-6963R1</style></elocation-id><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/jhr.53.3.0215-6963R1</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper studies the effect of increased product market competition on executive compensation and incentives. We use a reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment, and exploit its staggered implementation across municipalities for identification. Using employer-employee data, we find that increased competition following the reform raised total pay but reduced the sensitivity of pay to firm performance. This is consistent with theoretical results showing that a fall in entry costs weakens managerial incentive provision. Entry deregulation also increased performance-induced CEO turnover and firms’ probability of exit, suggesting that competition provides direct incentives for managerial effort.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>